Critical Review of B. B. Warfield's
"Perfectionism: The Theology of
Charles G. Finney"
by Bill Nicely
"It is admitted that theologians are
not infallible, in the interpretation of Scripture. It may, therefore,
happen in the future, as it has in the past, that interpretations
of the Bible, long confidently received, must be modified or
abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with what God teaches
in His works." Charles Hodge
Introduction
In the field of theological inquiry it is
quite common for men/women to publish their views. When theologians
state their particular views in writing it is most often with
the express purpose of convincing the reader that the view held
by the writer is accurate and true. When a writer would state
such views with such attendant purpose it is usually with the
understanding that such public display of those views subjects
itself to public scrutiny and criticism. Charles Grandison Finney
in 1846-1847 published two volumes containing his views on Systematic
Theology. In 1851 this work was revised, enlarged and partly
rewritten by the author. The 1851 edition of his Systematic Theology
was never revised by himself and, therefore, may be said to accurately
contain his views and positions on the subjects contained in
that volume.
Benjamin Breckenridge Warfield wrote several
articles on the subject of perfectionism which were originally
published in The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review
and, subsequent to his death, were compiled and published in
1931 in a two-volume set of books by Oxford University Press
titled Perfectionism. In Volume II, Chapter I of that
set Warfield addresses Oberlin Perfectionism and as Section IV
of that chapter, pages 166-215, "The Theology of Charles
G. Finney." It is clear from the contents of this section
that Warfield disagreed with Finney on numerous issues. The following
is a review of that article.
What is not my intent.
I do not intend to disprove Benjamin Warfield
in his theological views. I am summarily disqualified due to
a lack of familiarity with the great body of his written works.
I do not intend to prove Charles G. Finney in his theological
views. In my mind this is unnecessary due to the thoroughness
of his Systematic Theology. An attempt on my part at proving
his views would serve only to dilute his work. His work stands
on its own. I do not intend to address Benjamin Warfield's intentions
or motives. This lies wholly within the purview and judgement
of God.
What is my intent.
I intend to demonstrate that the article by
Benjamin Warfield is remarkably lacking in substantive argument.
I propose to demonstrate this lack of argument through the use
of formal logic principles. I intend to demonstrate that the
article is wrought with misrepresentations. I intend that this
review should be non-inflammatory and unprejudiced, the reader
determining for himself/herself if I was successful. The intent
is to persuade the reader that Benjamin Warfield's conclusions
about Finney's Systematic Theology are not substantiated by his
arguments and, further, that they are not an accurate representation
of Finney's views. My ultimate purpose is to convince the reader
that Finney's Theology was not disproved by Benjamin Warfield.
This would hopefully lead to an interest in Finney's work so
that the reader would read Finney's Systematic Theology with
a mind unbiased by faulty prejudices. Brother/sister, friend,
reader, come let us reason together, the truth will do us good.
Method
Formal logical argument is a tedious and quite
laborious task. This requires a working knowledge of the principles
involved. These principles include, but are not limited to, first
truths, necessary laws of the mind (reasoning), valid premises/conclusions
and logical fallacies. These are described/defined in most textbooks
on reasoning and logic. A brief review of these concepts follows.
Different Classes of Truth
Truth is, in its most commonly used sense,
synonymous with reality, fact, actuality. The study and attainment
of truth require the ability and exercise of thought. We attain
truth through three primary means: consciousness, reasoning and
the senses.
Consciousness and Self-Evident Truths
Consciousness reveals those truths to our
minds that are self-evident truths. These truths are universal
and necessary in that they are perceived as obligatory upon all
moral agents and require no proof or evidence of their existence.
The mind perceives or assumes them as true without reasoning
or argument. Some truths that belong to this class are as follows:
Cause and effect - The premise that shows
that all effects have a cause. There are no uncaused effects.
Space - The idea of matter, that it takes
up space.
Time - The idea of duration that we symbolize
as time.
Existence - That we exist; I think, therefore,
I am.
Personal identity - The idea of personal existence
and free will; one is the originator of his own actions.
Existence of others - The idea of the presence
of other moral agents.
Individuality - The idea that existence is
separate from other existences (other moral agents).
Intellect - The possession of the ability
to think, reason.
Sensibility - The possession of the ability
to feel, sense.
Will - The possession of the ability to choose,
act.
Conscience - The idea of blame and praise
for actions of moral choice.
Reasoning (The Intellect)
Reasoning is the process of thought that draws
inferences and conclusions from known premises. Often the premises
that are present through consciousness are assumed in the reasoning
process. E.g., The process of reasoning assumes the capacity
for thought or the presence of intellect and existence. Another
term that is synonymous with reasoning is argument. A formal
argument, known as a syllogism, contains three parts: the major
premise, the minor premise and the conclusion. An example:
All men are mortal, (major premise)
Socrates is a man, (minor premise)
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (conclusion)
Self-evident truths are often used in the
reasoning process as major premises. E.g., I exist. Each effect
has a cause. I did not cause my own existence. Therefore, the
cause of my existence rests outside self. A proposition is a
suggested conclusion that is then tested or proved by the process
of formal argument. Reasoning provides a second class or tier
of truths (as contrasted with self-evident truths) to the mind.
These are certain to the mind only when the supporting premises
are based on self-evident truths and are the result of a valid
argument.
Senses
The mind receives data through the senses
and makes that information available to the mind for thought.
We see other men and therefore acknowledge the existence of other
moral agents (We may only have received the truth of that existence
through our eyes, barring any other sensory information).
Reasoning
Some arguments contain several premises. This
is a legitimate form of argument. An argument is said to be valid
when it contains true premises and logical conclusions. An argument
is said to be invalid when it contains untrue or irrelevant premises
and/or the conclusions drawn do not follow (non sequitur).
Fallacies
A logical fallacy is any mistake in reasoning.
An invalid argument results when logical fallacies are introduced
into the process of reasoning. Listed below are some commonly
occurring logical fallacies including definitions and some examples.
Over-Generalization (Secundum quid)
Over-generalization in an argument takes place
when one makes a generalization from a limited number of cases.
The premises of the argument may be true but the conclusion is
exaggerated because of the limited database.
The two people I met in Anytown, USA were dishonest,
Therefore, all residents in Anytown, USA are dishonest.
Personal Attacks (Ad hominem)
A personal attack draws attention away from
the argument or premises and seeks to discredit that argument
by attacking the maker of the argument. This can be done in many
ways from a direct insult to an inferred incompetence.
How can you believe what he says considering that he is a Calvinist?
Cause and Effect (Post hoc ergo propter
hoc)
This fallacy takes place when someone claims
that a particular truth naturally follows from circumstances
when in fact no direct connection has been made.
The rooster crowed each morning.
Each morning that he crowed the sun rose afterwards.
He then concluded that his crowing was the
cause of the sun rising.
Appeal to Authority (Ad verecundiam)
This is a common fallacy employed in theological
debate. When a famous person agrees/agreed with a conclusion
there is a tendency to ascribe trueness to that conclusion based
on the reputation of the famous person. Sometimes the person
will claim the authority of the Bible when no connection has
been made or the argument is inconsistent with Scripture. The
conclusion is either true or untrue based on necessary laws of
the mind. Agreement/disagreement of any individual does not influence
the truth of a statement.
This view on the atonement was also held by
Augustine or Calvin or Warfield or . . . (any person revered
as authoritative).
Appeal to the Crowd (Ad populum)
This fallacy is related to the Appeal to Authority
in that no valid argument is given, only hearsay. The difference
is that the argument is based on mass appeal rather than individual
agreement. Regardless of the number who have held the view in
the past, the argument is either valid or invalid on its own.
This view on the atonement has been held by
all orthodox believers in the history of the church. Or, everyone
knows that the world is flat.
Circular Arguments (Circulus in probando)
This fallacy takes place when the truth to
be proven is assumed true as a premise.
My view on the atonement is the true one.
Your view is different from my view and is therefore false.
Since your view is obviously false, mine must be true.
Two-Valued Or Black/White Approach
This fallacy states that there are only two
possible sides to an argument or that a side under consideration
is either right or wrong, hence, black/white.
You are either Calvinist or Arminian. There are no other choices/possibilities.
I elaborate on the idea of fallacies out of
necessity to lay a groundwork for exposing these logical fallacies
as they appear in Warfield's article. Warfield employs a device
in argument known as reductio ad absurdum. Webster defines
this, "to disprove a proposition by showing the absurdity
to which it leads when carried to its logical conclusion."
The idea is to expose the underlying premises or the resultant
conclusions as absurd. This is a valid form of logical argument
only when sound reasoning is employed. Warfield, however, employed
many logical fallacies in the use of this device, as will be
shown.
I have organized the subjects addressed by
Warfield in his article to aid in the systematic study of them.
Warfield used quotes from Finney's work to lay before the mind
of the reader what Finney was teaching. Warfield would then typically
draw conclusions and/or inferences from these quotations and
proceed on the basis of reductio ad absurdum as previously
mentioned.
This approach appears like this:
Introductory statements (includes Warfield's
interpretation of Finney)
Quotes from Finney
Arguments
Inferences and Conclusions (Reductio Ad Absurdum)
This article follows this scheme:
Subject heading
Warfield's representations of Finney's view
This section contains Warfield's interpretation
(what Warfield believes Finney to mean or what Warfield suggests
Finney meant). Watch for the subtle differences he injects into
Finney's views to represent (often misrepresent) Finney's intended
meaning.
Quotes from Finney
These are direct quotes from Finney's Systematic
Theology. Often snippets of statements are used for dramatic
effect but, when taken in context they suggest a different meaning.
Compare these sections with Finney's conclusions (which follow
at the end of each subject).
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
This is where Warfield employs reductio
ad absurdum and attempts to disprove Finney's views. This
is what is most often being responded to in Analysis of arguments.
Analysis of arguments
This section contains the bulk of the logical
argument and demonstration of Warfield's fallacies.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
Finney speaks for himself. The strongest argument
available.
MORAL ABILITY and THE INFLUENCE OF THE
HOLY SPIRIT
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
". . . obligation is limited by ability;
that we are able to do all that we are under obligation to do;
that nothing which we cannot do lies within the range of our
duty. He himself represents this as the fundamental principle
of his teaching-"1 "He means . . . that man has by
his natural constitution as a free agent the inalienable power
to obey God perfectly."2 ". . . along with their ability
to do it, is an equally strong assertion of their universal unwillingness
to do it, on the ground of which is erected an assertion of the
necessity of the influence of the Spirit for salvation."3
"The mode of securing these efforts, however, is purely
suasive."4 "Beyond the presentation of motive to action
he will not permit the Spirit to go in the way of securing man's
salvation."5
Quotes from Finney employed
". . . that obligation implies ability
in the sense that it is possible for man to be all that he is
under obligation to be; that by willing, he can directly or indirectly
do all that God requires him to do."6 "This ability
is called a natural ability, because it belongs to man as a moral
agent, in such a sense that without it he could not be a proper
subject of command, of reward or punishment. That is, without
this liberty or ability he could not be a moral agent, and a
proper subject of moral government."7 "Moral agency
implies free agency. Free agency implies liberty of will. Liberty
of will implies ability of will."8 ". . . ability to
obey God . . . the possession of the power adequate to the performance
of that which is required."9 ". . . from the beginning
they universally and voluntarily consecrate their powers to the
gratification of self, and that therefore they will not, unless
they are divinely persuaded, by the gracious influence of the
Holy Spirit, in any case turn and consecrate their powers to
the service of God."10 "The question in debate is not
whether men do, in any case, use the powers of nature in the
manner that God requires, without the gracious influence of the
Holy Spirit, but whether they are able so to use them."11
"I admit and maintain that regeneration is always induced
and effected by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit . . .
It is agreed that all who are converted, sanctified and saved,
are converted, sanctified and saved by God's own agency; that
is, God saves them by securing, by His own agency, their personal
and individual holiness."12 ". . . God will convert
and sanctify the elect . . . by free grace drawing and securing
the concurrence of the free will."13 ". . . that men
are able to resist the utmost influence that the truth can exert
upon them; and therefore have ability to defeat the wisest, most
benevolent, and most powerful exertions which the Holy Spirit
can make to effect their sanctification."14
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
"They will not; he will not admit that
they cannot."15 "A universal will-not, like this, has
a very strong appearance of a cannot. A condition in which a
particular effect follows with absolute certainty, at least suggests
the existence of a causal relation . . ."16 "Surely
the action of the Spirit on the elect has the appearance of having
a character more causal in nature than is expressed by the term
persuasion."17 "It speaks volumes meanwhile for the
strength of Finney's conviction that man is quite able to save
himself and in point of fact actually does, in every instance
of his salvation, save himself, that he maintained it in the
face of such broad facts of experience to the contrary."18
". . . this extravagant assertion of plenary ability."19
Analysis of arguments
Warfield employs the logical fallacy of post
hoc ergo propter hoc or cause and effect (Remember
the example of the crowing rooster?). He infers that since man
invariably sins that this is de facto evidence of a causal
relationship. All that he can logically state is that the action
invariably follows, nothing more. Also, when a premise is equally
consistent with both propositions in an argument then it proves
neither. At this stage neither Warfield (man is constitutionally
depraved and thus unable) nor Finney (man is voluntarily depraved
and thus able) has proven his proposition. Both propositions
are consistent with the isolated concept of man's total
moral depravity. In regards to man's ability to save himself
Warfield confuses man's ability to choose, which is a condition
(not without which) of salvation, with the ground (for the sake
of which) of salvation, which is God's benevolence as displayed
in His mercy. This confusion between conditions and grounds leads
Warfield to many illogical conclusions regarding Finney's theology.
Warfield does not logically prove his point or logically disprove
Finney's point but, merely expresses dogmatic opinion without
addressing the real argument.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"The question of ability is one of great
practical importance. To deny the ability of man to obey the
commandments of God, is to represent God as a hard master, as
requiring a natural impossibility of His creatures on pain of
eternal damnation. This necessarily begets in the mind that believes
it hard thoughts of God. The intelligence cannot be satisfied
with the justice of such a requisition. In fact, so far as this
error gets possession of the mind and gains assent, just so far
it naturally and necessarily excuses itself for disobedience,
or for not complying with the commandments of God."20 And
lest any should think that Finney bethrones man's ability, "Let
it be distinctly understood before we close this subject, that
we do not deny, but strenuously maintain, that the whole plan
of salvation and all the influences, both providential and spiritual,
which God exerts in the conversion, sanctification and salvation
of sinners, is grace from first to last . . ."21
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"It may be taken as revealing Finney's
own consciousness of the essentially ethical character of his
treatise. It is a system of teleological [Webster defines, "relating
to design or purpose in nature"] ethics which he presents
to us; or, to be more precise, we may perhaps say in modern phraseology,
that it is a system of hedonistic [happiness] as distinguished
from eudaemonistic [welfare] ethics . . . is the ethical end,
the ultimate object to be achieved by action and conduct, the
standard and final criterion of what ought to be . . ."22
". . . that happiness is the chief good and benevolence
the comprehensive virtue, and actions are good or bad according
as they do or do not manifest the one and promote the other."23
"The 'good' has become the 'happiness' - or the 'welfare'-
of the whole body of sentient beings; and the 'right' that which
tends to this."24 "Thus all obligation is reduced strictly
to the single obligation to choose the good of being as our supreme
ultimate end. The ground of obligation is . . . its intrinsic
value to being."25 ". . . Charles Hodge is doubtless
justified . . . to reduce Finney's teleological ethics to absurdity.
He says that it belongs to the same mintage with Jesuit 'intentionalism'-'the
means are justified by the end' . . . When stated in an abstract
form the observation made by Hodge is so immediately obvious,
as not to require argument for its justification." And,
". . . the means acquire all the moral quality which they
possess from their relation as means to their end. It was the
taunt that this involved [intentionalism] . . . which stung Finney
to his unavailing answer."26
Quotes from Finney
"But if the rightarian be the true theory,
then disinterested benevolence is sin. According to this scheme,
the right, and not the good of being, is the end to, and for
which, God and all moral agents ought to live. According to this
theory, disinterested benevolence can never be duty, can never
be right, but always and necessarily wrong." And, "If
moral agents ought to will the right for the sake of the right,
or will good, not for the sake of the good, but for the sake
of the relation of rightness existing between the choice and
the good, then to will the good for its own sake is sin. It is
not willing the right end. It is willing the good and not the
right as an ultimate end. These are opposing theories. Both cannot
be true. Which is the right to will, the good for its own sake,
or the right? Let universal reason answer."27
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
"'Right' has the form of a past participle,
and it is not overpressing its suggestion to say that it expresses
not so much the straight as the straightened: behind it lies
the idea of rule, regulation, government: it is cognate not only
with regular but regal-in short it expresses 'conformed to rule,'
with a subaudition of authority." And, ". . . not the
man whose conduct is suitable to his nature but the man whose
conduct is in accordance with law. The ethics of right is accordingly
justly spoken of as "authoritative morality," the ethics
which imposes itself as obligatory per se, and not merely
on the ground of expediency calculated from its tendency to an
end presumed to be a good, supposedly the supreme good. The right
is not a means to something else conceived as the supreme good,
but is itself the supreme good imposed on us as our duty by an
adequate authority."28 "Undoubtedly these are opposing
theories. . . But, you cry out, you cannot will the good because
it is right and for its own sake at the same time. Why not, if
it is right to will the good for its own sake? The universal
ground of moral obligation is that we must do right. The particular
ground of this special obligation lies in the value of the object
chosen-but, mind you, its moral value - indicates the
rightness of its choice." And, "That is the very reason
why he ought to choose benevolence as his rule of life. It is
right."29
"Everybody, of course, understands that
a right intention is necessary to the rightness of an action.
The point raised is whether that is all that is necessary. Is
it true that if your intention is right, your action is right?
This is the Jesuit doctrine: the rightness of the intention makes
the action right. It is Finney's doctrine." And, "In
reply to Hodge, Finney says a great deal which is wholly ineffective
because not to the point."30 "In his system things-whether
means or other things-are not good in themselves: they receive
their goodness for their relation-as means or otherwise-to the
supreme ultimate end, which is defined as the good of being.
He cannot subintroduce here an attribute of intrinsic goodness
to them": 31 "It remains true that any means, any whatever,
which are brought into a system of means looking towards the
indicated end, is in Finney's view made good by its relation
as means to this end."32 "If this is the first act,
it is also the last-for it is the whole thing. The only thing
that has moral character is the ultimate choice, and, the ultimate
choice having become benevolence, the sinner has wholly ceased
to be a sinner, and become altogether righteous."33
Analysis of arguments
Warfield admits that the ground of moral obligation
lies in the value of the object chosen. He then makes the distinction
that it is the moral value that creates the obligation
but does not tell us to what he compares this. He then states
that the foundation of obligation is the rightness of a choice.
Warfield cannot have it both ways. He admits that these are opposite
choices yet, he holds both to be true, and, considers Finney
to be in error for stating that the value of the end chosen is
the foundation of moral obligation. Warfield does not prove that
right is the foundation of moral obligation. He bases his conclusion
on his manufactured definition (Warfield goes so far as to attribute
a part of speech, past participle, to the word) of the word "right"
and then uses that definition as a premise in further argument.
This is the logical fallacy known as petitio principii
(begging the question) in which a premise to be proved is implicitly
taken for granted. Warfield believed that he proved his point
through mere profundity and verbosity. I desist here to elaborate
because Finney's summing up of the foundation of moral obligation
found in the next section is convincing.
In regards to Finney holding that, ".
. . any means, any whatever, which are brought into a system
of means looking towards the indicated end, is in Finney's view
made good by its relation as means to this end," or 'intentionalism'
it seems that Warfield did not read Finney's unavailing answer
carefully. In the next section is an abbreviated portion of Finney's
answer to Hodge which, I believe, the reader will judge to sufficiently
contradict the claim that Finney was an 'intentionalist.' Suffice
it to say that Warfield confuses proximate(immediate) and ultimate
choices and did not distinguish in his mind the process the human
mind goes through in making choices. Finney wrote, "I must
distinguish more clearly between ultimate and proximate intentions,
which discrimination will show, that in the most strict and proper
sense, obligation belongs to the former, and only in a less strict
and proper sense, to the latter.
An ultimate end, be it remembered, is an object
chosen for its own sake.
A proximate end is an object chosen as a condition
or means of securing an ultimate end.
An ultimate end is an object chosen because
of its intrinsic nature and value.
A proximate end is an object chosen for the
sake of the end, and upon condition of its relation as a condition
or means of the end.
Example: A student labors to get wages, to
purchase books, to obtain an education, to preach the gospel,
to save souls, and to please God. Another labors to get wages,
to purchase books, to get an education, to preach the gospel,
to secure a salary, and his own ease and popularity. In the first
supposition he loves God and souls, and seeks, as his ultimate
end, the happiness of souls, and the glory and gratification
of God. In the last case supposed, he loves himself supremely
and his ultimate end is his own gratification. Now the proximate
end, or immediate objects of pursuit, in these two cases, are
precisely alike, while their ultimate ends are entirely opposite.
Their first, or nearest, end is to get wages. Their next end,
is to obtain books; and so we follow them, until we ascertain
their ultimate end, before we learn the moral character of what
they are doing. The means they are using, i.e., their immediate
objects or proximate ends of pursuit, are the same, but the ultimate
ends at which they aim are entirely different, and every moral
agent, from a necessary law of his intellect, must, as soon as
he understands the ultimate end of each, pronounce the one virtuous,
and the other sinful, in his pursuits. One is selfish and the
other benevolent. From this illustration it is plain, that strictly
speaking, moral character, and, of course, moral obligation,
respect directly the ultimate intention only. We shall see, in
the proper place, that obligation also extends, but less directly,
to the use of means to obtain the end."
It is obvious from Finney's writing that he
fully intended to distinguish his views from intentionalism and
that he took great pains to explain that a moral agent who chooses
benevolence as an ultimate end must choose benevolent means,
or means calculated to bring the end intended, and, consistent
with the characteristics of benevolence (See Attributes of Love
in Lectures on Systematic Theology). It is peculiar that Warfield
overlooked the distinctions that Finney made in these areas and
stumbled into a logomachy (a dispute over words, marked by verbiage).
I find Warfield's inferences to be confusing and interminable
yet, at one point he claims that Hodge's observation that Finney
is an intentionalist "is so immediately obvious, as not
to require argument for its justification."
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"The fact is, the law requires the supreme
love of God, and the equal love of our neighbor. It says nothing,
and implies nothing, about doing right for the sake of the right.
Rightarianism is a rejection of the divine law, and a substituting
in its stead an entirely different rule of obligation: a rule
that deifies right, that rejects the claim of God, and exalts
right to the throne."34 "This attribute of benevolence
[veracity or honesty] secures it against every attempt to promote
the ultimate good of being by means of falsehood. True benevolence
will no more, can no more, resort to falsehood as a means of
promoting good, than it can contradict or deny itself. The intelligence
affirms, that the highest ultimate good can be secured only by
a strict adherence to truth."35 "Again: we have seen
that the means cannot be chosen until the end is chosen. The
choice of the end is distinct from the volitions or endeavors
of the mind to secure the end. But although the choice of an
end is not identical with the subordinate choices and volitions
to secure the end, yet it necessitates them. The choice once
made, secures or necessitates the executive volitions to secure
the end."36
Finney's unavailing answer [regarding Hodge's
charge of 'intentionalism']: "I now proceed to inquire,
in what sense the doctrine, that the end sanctifies the means
is true, after which, I shall show in what sense it is false.
1. It is true in the sense that the end, design
or ultimate intention, gives character to the use of means to
accomplish the end. The mere outward act has no moral character,
except as its character is derived from the end, or design of
the mind. This everybody knows to be true, and this no one can
honestly and intelligently deny.
2. The doctrine that the end sanctifies the
means, is true in the sense, that from the laws of the mind,
a moral agent in the honest pursuit of an ultimate end, can use
no other than means which he honestly regards as the appropriate
and necessary means. That is, his intention must secure the use
of means, and the means which, in the honest apprehension of
his mind, are the appropriate and necessary means to that end.
For example: if his end be benevolent, he can use no other than
benevolent means. If he is honest in the choice of an end, that
is, if he chooses an end in accordance with the dictates of reason
and revelation, he cannot but choose the means by the same rule.
He cannot choose an end in obedience to God and reason, and then
disobey and disregard both, or either, in the use of means to
secure his end. This is impossible." And,
"3. But the end does not sanctify the
means, in the sense, that any means whatever may be justly resorted
to, to secure a good end. Now this is the very sense, in which
the Jesuits hold that the end sanctifies the means, and herein
consists their error, and from this resulted all the odious and
ridiculous consequences with which they are chargeable. They
held, that a good end justifies or sanctifies the use of any
means whatever; that is, that a benevolent end might justify
unbenevolent means, or more strictly, that the benevolence of
the design imparts the same character to the use of any means
whatever." And, "These, and only these [benevolent
means], are the means that he ought to use; and being honest,
they are the only means he can consent to use, and his intention
gives character to their use. No man is, or can be honest, who
has access to a Bible, in the selection of either ends or means,
without consulting the judgement and the will of God respecting
both. But I am aware that, to leave this question here, will
be unsatisfactory to this reviewer [Hodge], and to those that
agree with him [Warfield]. They will inquire, but what are benevolent
means? Are not any means benevolent, which are necessary to secure
the highest good of the universe? To this I answer, yes. They
inquire again, may not this end, in some cases at least, require
injustice and lying, fraud and various forms of sin? I answer,
no. The difficulty with this writer is, that he regards benevolence
as a simple, unintelligent choice of happiness, having no necessary
regard to the means whatever. So the Jesuits regarded it. Hence,
their perversion. This writer is unable to point out the error
of the Jesuits, if he admits, which he cannot but do, in respect
to acts of will, that moral character belongs to the ultimate
intention, and that the means must partake of the character of
the end. This writer and the Jesuits regard benevolence as a
simple choice of happiness, and of course as possessing no attributes
whatever."37
Finney sums up: "Lastly, I come to the
consideration of the practical bearings of what I regard as the
true theory of the foundation of moral obligation, namely, that
the intrinsic nature and value of the highest well-being of God
and of the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation.
Upon this philosophy I remark-
That if this be true, the whole subject of
moral obligation is perfectly simple and intelligible; so plain,
indeed, that "the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err
therein."
Upon this theory, moral obligation respects
the choice of an ultimate end.
This end is a clear, simple unit.
It is necessarily known to every moral agent.
The choice of this end is the whole of virtue.
It is impossible to sin while this end is
sincerely intended with all the heart and with all the soul.
Upon this theory, every moral agent knows
in every possible instance what is right, and can never mistake
his real duty.
We may state it thus-
His duty is to will this end with all the
known conditions and means thereof. Intending this end with a
single eye, and doing what appears to him, with all the light
he can obtain, to be in the highest degree calculated to secure
this end, he really does his duty. If in this case he is mistaken
in regard to what is the best means of securing this end, still,
with a benevolent intention, he does not sin. He has done right,
for he has intended as he ought, and acted outwardly as he thought
was the path of duty, under the best light he could obtain. This,
then, was his duty. He did not mistake his duty; because it was
duty to intend as he intended, and under the circumstances, to
act as he acted. How else should he have acted?
This ultimate intention is right, and nothing
else is right, more or less.
Right and wrong respect ultimate intention
only, and are always the same. Right can be predicated only of
good will, and wrong only of selfishness. These are fixed and
permanent. If a moral agent can know what end he aims at or lives
for, he can know, and cannot but know, at all times, whether
he is right or wrong. All that upon this theory a moral agent
needs to be certain of is, whether he lives for the right end,
and this, if at all honest, or if dishonest, he really cannot
but know. If he would ask, what is right or what is duty at any
time, he need not wait for a reply. It is right for him to intend
the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does this,
he cannot mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs
the whole of duty. With this honest intention, it is impossible
that he should not use the means to promote this end, according
to the best light he has; and this is right. A single eye to
the highest good of God and the universe, is the whole of morality,
strictly considered; and, upon this theory, moral law, moral
government, moral obligation, virtue, vice, and the whole subject
of morals and religion are the perfection of simplicity. If this
theory be true, no honest mind ever mistook the path of duty.
To intend the highest good of being is right and is duty. No
mind is honest that is not steadily pursuing this end. But in
the honest pursuit of this end there can be no sin, no mistaking
the path of duty. That is and must be the path of duty that really
appears to a benevolent mind to be so. That is, it must be his
duty to act in conformity with his honest convictions. This is
duty, this is right. So, upon this theory, no one who is truly
honest in pursuing the highest good of being, ever did or can
mistake his duty in any such sense as to commit sin. I have spoken
with great plainness, and perhaps with some severity, of the
several systems of error, as I cannot but regard them, upon the
most fundamental and important of subjects; not certainly from
any want of love to those who hold them, but from a concern,
long cherished and growing upon me, for the honor of truth and
for the good of being. Should any of you ever take the trouble
to look into this subject, in its length and breadth, and read
the various systems, and take the trouble to trace out their
practical results, as actually developed in the opinions and
practices of men, you certainly would not be at a loss to account
for the theological and philosophical fogs that so bewilder the
world. How can it be otherwise, while such confusion of opinion
prevails upon the fundamental question of morals and religion?
How is it, that there is so much profession
and so little real practical benevolence in the world? Multitudes
of professed Christians seem to have no conception that benevolence
constitutes true religion; that nothing else does; and that selfishness
is sin, and totally incompatible with religion. They live on
in their self-indulgences, and dream of heaven. This could not
be, if the true idea of religion, as consisting in sympathy with
the benevolence of God, was fully developed in their minds."38
MORAL DEPRAVITY
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"Naturally he scouts the very idea of
"original sin," whether in its broader or narrower
application. There is no imputation; no transmitted corruption
of heart."39 "It will have already been observed that
it is denied of the first stages of infancy. It accordingly does
not belong to mankind as such, as at present existing in the
world; it is not a racial affair. It is picked up for himself
by each individual in the process of living."40 "These
little brutes of babies, like other brutes, of course follow
their impulses. These, being constitutional, have no moral quality.
But one fair day the babies awake to moral values, and then their
whole habitual activity at once becomes sin."41 "What
Adam has to do with it is this - because Adam sinned, and because
all after Adam have sinned - they all would have inevitably have
sinned whether Adam had sinned or not - the physical nature inherited
by babies is to a certain extent disordered, and this makes their
impulse to self-gratification perhaps somewhat more clamant than
otherwise it would have been."42 "He energetically
denies that the race on which this depravity is brought is a
guilty race, or that it can be conceived as a punishment. He
presents it as the account of how the human race - in all the
length and breadth of it - becomes in the first instance sinful,
in any sense of that word. And his object is to represent it
as becoming so voluntarily-with a voluntariness, which, although
embracing every individual of the race, is repeated in each individual's
case in the completest isolation of distinct personal action."43
"To him on the contrary, everything which is not the substance
of the soul is one of its acts; and as he cannot attribute sinfulness
to the soul itself, he therefore confines all sin to actual sinning."44
"Affections, as such, have no character; they are but the
innocent susceptibilities of our nature, and their most violent
workings are innocent, except so far as they are produced or
modified by a previous deliberate act of the will."45
Quotes from Finney
"Subsequent to the commencement of moral
agency, and previous to regeneration, the moral depravity of
mankind is universal."46 ". . . without any mixture
of moral goodness or virtue. . . "47 "Previous to moral
agency, infants are no more subjects of moral government than
brutes are;"48 ". . . their sufferings and death are
to be accounted for as are those of brutes, namely, by ascribing
them to physical interference with the laws of life and health."49
"The fact that Christ died in the stead and behalf of sinners,
proves that God regarded them not as unfortunate, but as criminal
and altogether without excuse. "50 ". . . from circumstances
that would result in certain and eternal death, and are by grace
made heirs of eternal life. But after all, it is useless to speculate
about the character and destiny of those who are confessedly
not moral agents. The benevolence of God will take care of them."51
"We can also predict, without the gift of prophecy, that
with a constitution physically depraved, and surrounded with
objects to awaken appetite, and with all the circumstances in
which human beings first form their moral character, they will
seek universally to gratify themselves, unless prevented by the
illuminations of the Holy Spirit."52 ". . . the sensibility
acts as a powerful impulse to the will, from the moment of birth,
and secures the consent and activity of the will to procure its
gratification, before the reason is at all developed. The will
is thus committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite,
when first the idea of moral obligation is developed. This committed
state of the will is not moral depravity, and has no moral character,
until the idea of moral obligation is developed. The moment this
idea is developed, this committal of the will to self-indulgence
must be abandoned, or it becomes selfishness, or moral depravity.
But, as the will is already in a state of committal, and has
to some extent already formed the habit of seeking to gratify
feeling, and as the idea of moral obligation is at first but
feebly developed, unless the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light
on the soul, the will, as might be expected, retains its hold
on self-gratification." And, "A diseased physical system
renders the appetites, passions, tempers, and propensities more
clamorous and despotic in their demands, and of course constantly
urging to selfishness, confirms and strengthens it. It should
be distinctly remembered that physical depravity has no moral
character in itself. But yet it is a source of fierce temptation
to selfishness. The human sensibility is, manifestly, deeply
physically depraved; and as sin, or moral depravity, consists
in committing the will to the gratification of the sensibility,
its physical depravity will mightily strengthen moral depravity.
Moral depravity is then universally owing to temptation."53
"To represent the constitution as sinful, is to represent
God, who is the author of the constitution, as the author of
sin. To say that God is not the direct former of the constitution,
but that sin is conveyed by natural generation from Adam, who
made himself sinful, is only to remove the objection one step
farther back, but not to obviate it; for God established the
physical laws that of necessity bring about this result."54
"Sin may be the result of temptation; temptation may be
universal, and of such a nature as uniformly, not necessarily,
to result in sin, unless a contrary result be secured by a Divine
moral suasion."55 "Sin may be, and must be, an abuse
of free agency; and this may be accounted for, as we shall see,
by ascribing it to the universality of temptation, and does not
at all imply a sinful constitution . . . Free, responsible will
is an adequate cause in the presence of temptation, without the
supposition of a sinful constitution, as has been demonstrated
in the case of Adam and of angels . . . it is said that no motive
to sin could be a motive or a temptation, if there were not a
sinful taste, relish, or appetite, inherent in the constitution,
to which the temptation or motive is addressed . . . To this
I reply:
Suppose this objection be applied to the sin
of Adam and of angels. Can we not account for Eve's eating the
forbidden fruit without supposing that she had a craving for
sin?"56 "We deny that the human constitution is morally
depraved, because it is impossible that sin should be a quality
of the substance of soul or body. It is, and must be, a quality
of choice or intention, and not of substance."57 "But
if it be anything, it must be either substance or action."58
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
"We suppose this [interference with the
laws of life and health] is the proximate cause of the sufferings
and death of adults also; but Finney appears to think that, in
saying it of infants, he is denying that sin has anything to
do with their dying . . ."59 "No doubt, in saying this
[Christ died in the stead and behalf of sinners] he had adults
in mind-but, is it not a proposition of universal validity, and
then, how can infants be partakers of this grace of Christ?"60
"And can we acquiesce without protest, when we are told
that infants are 'confessedly not moral agents'? Perhaps if we
press the word 'agents'-but let us substitute 'beings'? Are infants
not moral beings? Does a man cease to be a moral being every
time he goes to sleep? Are we moral beings only when we are acting,
but become unmoral and only brutes whenever we are quiescent?"61
"We have here of course only the familiar construction of
the old Rationalismus Vulgaris; and no more here than
there is the implication of God in bringing the human race into
a condition of universal depravity escaped. It was God, no doubt,
who made the human race after such a fashion that its selfish
impulses should get the start of its reason in the development
of the child, who should therefore be hopelessly committed to
sin before it knew any better."62 "All that is accomplished
by this explanation of how it comes about that man is morally
depraved, is that God and not man is made inexcusable for it.
God betrays mankind into depravity wholly arbitrarily, with no
excuse, not to say justification, for His act. All that can be
said is that this is the way God has chosen to make man. No reason
is assigned, none is assignable, for His making him in such a
manner that he must at the first dawn of moral agency become
totally and hopelessly depraved. If anyone supposes that an exoneration
for God is supplied in the circumstance that He does not directly
create depravity in the human heart, but produces it only indirectly,
through the operation of the laws of human development which
He has ordained, we are happy to say that Finney is above such
a subterfuge." And, "He leaves God equally responsible
for human depravity, and deprives Him of all justification for
attaching it to man."63 "A tendency is exhibited at
times to neglect this more elaborate explanation of universal
depravity, and to represent it as sufficiently accounted for
by the formula of freedom plus temptation. All men are free agents,
and all men are tempted; therefore all men sin. The formula is
obviously inoperative . . . unless free agency is supposed to
carry with it, per se, helplessness in the face of temptation,
and always to succumb to temptation if it is addressed to it
in an enticing form."64 "Free agency plus temptation
may account for the possibility of sin, and may lay a basis for
an account of the actual occurrence of sinning in this or that
case. It will not account for universal sinning. For that, nothing
less than a universal bias to sin will supply an adequate account."65
"The child, he teaches-that little brute-must be supposed
to have acquired habits of action which his moral sense, so soon
as moral agency dawns in him, pronounces to be sinful, if we
are to account for his universal succumbing to solicitations
to what he now perceives to be sin. He has acquired a bias to
what is objectively sinful . . ."66 "He knows and will
know nothing therefore of a sinful 'nature,' or 'constitution'
as he likes to call it, embodying his argument in a word. It
is his psychology which is at fault. The soul, to him, consists
of its substance and its acts; there is nothing more, and there
is room for nothing more-for such things, for example, as permanent,
though separable, dispositions. He will allow no other than these
two categories. His psychology compels him thus to reject any
and every doctrine which appears to him to imply anything permanent
in the soul, permanently affecting its actions, except the bare
soul itself. He therefore constantly speaks as if the Augustinians
thought of the sinfulness of the soul as a modification of the
soul itself in its very substance . . . "67 "It follows,
on this principle, that love to God and hatred of Him, are equally
different things; and that they become praiseworthy or criminal,
solely in consequence of their connection with some previous
purpose of mind."68
Analysis of arguments
Warfield concludes that Finney believed infants
die innocently. Next he suggests that if this were true then
infants could not receive grace from Christ. Then Warfield tries
to make a distinction between moral agents and moral beings.
He asks, "Are infants not moral beings?", without defining
this term. Warfield has now shifted the argument away from Finney's
subject (whether infants are moral agents, able to sin) and into
a discussion of whether men are moral beings while asleep. The
connection between the two subjects is not clear, however, one
might ask if Warfield is trying to establish that men sin in
their sleep. Warfield completely overlooks the distinctions that
Finney made concerning what constitutes moral agency, namely,
intellect, sensibility and free will. Does an infant possess
these in such a measure as to indicate moral obligation? Or does
the infant merely act in response to outside stimuli? This is
the real issue, not whether men are brutes when quiet. Nevertheless,
infants would not be barred from receiving grace, a free gift,
solely on the basis that they had not sinned. Is God limited
to extending grace to only the sinful and not to the innocent?
Warfield is silent on this subject.
Warfield accuses Finney of making God the
author of sin by designing and creating man in such a fashion
as leads man "hopelessly" to sin. This is a fallacy,
trying to infer a cause and effect relationship when none exists.
Warfield represents Finney's scheme as God arbitrarily betraying
mankind into depravity. This is not a fair representation of
Finney's views. Finney claimed that mankind was totally, voluntarily
depraved. Man is depraved because man chose to sin, not
because he was born with a natural disposition or bias that forces
him to sin.
Warfield then states that total moral depravity
cannot be accounted for by free will plus temptation, "nothing
less than a universal bias to sin will supply an adequate account."
This is the two-valued or black/white fallacy where there is
only the right way (Warfield's) or the wrong way (any different
view). Does Warfield supply logical argument to refute Finney's
view or support his own? No, he merely asserts this to be true
as if that was all that was required. This is a petitio principii
or begging the question. Warfield represents Finney as believing
that once a child reaches the age of understanding that he or
she has habits or biases that his or her conscience condemns
as sinful. Finney would state that these habits or biases are
sinful only when acted upon contrary to a morally obligated opposite
choice.
Warfield states that Finney will have nothing
to do with a "sinful 'nature' or 'constitution'". He
goes on to state that Finney's psychology is at fault, again
without an argument. Warfield states that Finney has no room
for "permanent, though separable, dispositions". How
something can be permanent and separable one cannot tell but,
neither does Warfield. Again, a bare assertion with no supporting
argument. A cursory perusal of Finney's Theology would leave
one with the impression that Finney clearly regarded moral obligation
as consisting in free, intelligent choice.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"1. Adam, being the natural head of the
race, would naturally, by the wisest constitution of things,
greatly affect for good or evil his whole posterity.
2. His sin in many ways exposed his posterity
to aggravated temptation. Not only the physical constitution
of all men, but all the influences under which they first form
their moral character, are widely different from what they would
have been, if sin had never been introduced.
3. When selfishness is understood to be the
whole of moral depravity, its quo modo, or in what way
it comes to exist, is manifest. Clear conceptions of the thing
will instantly reveal the occasion and manner.
4. The only difficulty in accounting for it,
has been the false assumption, that there must be, and is, something
lying back of the free actions of the will, which sustains to
those actions the relation of a cause, that is itself sinful.
5. If holy Adam, and holy angels could fall
under temptations addressed to their undepraved sensibility,
how absurd it is to conclude, that sin in those who are born
with a physically depraved constitution, cannot be accounted
for, without ascribing it to original sin, or to a nature that
is in itself sinful.
6. Without divine illumination, the moral
character will of course be formed under the influence of the
flesh. That is, the lower propensities will of course influence
the will, unless the reason be developed by the Holy Spirit.
7. The dogma of constitutional moral depravity,
is a part and parcel of the doctrine of a necessitated will.
It is a branch of a grossly false and heathenish philosophy.
How infinitely absurd, dangerous, and unjust, then, to embody
it in a standard of Christian doctrine, to give it the place
of an indispensable article of faith, and denounce all who will
not swallow its absurdities, as heretics!
8. We are unable to say precisely at what
age infants become moral agents, and of course how early they
become sinners. Doubtless there is much difference among children
in this respect. Reason is developed in one earlier than in another,
according to the constitution and circumstances.
A thorough consideration of the subject, will
doubtless lead to the conviction, that children become moral
agents much earlier than is generally supposed. The conditions
of moral agency are, as has been repeatedly said in former lectures,
the possession of the powers of moral agency, together with the
development of the ideas of the good or valuable, of moral obligation
or oughtness-of right and wrong-of praise and blameworthiness.
I have endeavored to show, in former lectures, that mental satisfaction,
blessedness or happiness, is the ultimate good. Satisfaction
arising from the gratification of the appetites, is one of the
earliest experiences of human beings. This no doubt suggests
or develops, at a very early period, the idea of the good or
the valuable. The idea is doubtless developed, long before the
word that expresses it is understood. The child knows that happiness
is good, and seeks it in the form of self-gratification, long
before the terms that designate this state of mind are at all
understood. It knows that its own enjoyment is worth seeking,
and doubtless very early has the idea, that the enjoyment of
others is worth seeking, and affirms to itself, not in words,
but in idea, that it ought to please its parents and those around
it. It knows, in fact, though language is as yet unknown, that
it loves to be gratified, and to be happy, that it loves and
seeks enjoyment for itself, and doubtless has the idea that it
ought not to displease and distress those around it, but that
it ought to endeavor to please and gratify them. This is probably
among the first ideas, if not the very first idea, of the pure
reason that is developed, that is, the idea of the good, the
valuable, the desirable; and the next must be that of oughtness,
or of moral obligation, or of right and wrong, etc. I say again,
these ideas are, and must be developed, before the signs or words
that express them are at all understood, and the words would
never be understood except the idea were first developed. We
always find, at the earliest period at which children can understand
words, that they have the idea of obligation, of right and wrong.
As soon as these words are understood by them, they recognize
them as expressing ideas already in their own minds, and which
ideas they have had further back than they can remember. Some,
and indeed most persons, seem to have the idea, that children
affirm themselves to be under moral obligation, before they have
the idea of the good; that they affirm their obligation to obey
their parents before they know, or have the idea of the good
or of the valuable. But this is, and must be a mistake. They
may and do affirm obligation to obey their parents, before they
can express in language, and before they would understand, a
statement of the ground of their obligation. The idea, however,
they have, and must have, or they could not affirm obligation."
And,
"12. Why is sin so natural to mankind?
Not because their nature is itself sinful, but because the appetites
and passions tend so strongly to self-indulgence. These are temptations
to sin, but sin itself consists not in these appetites and propensities,
but in the voluntary committal of the will to their indulgence.
This committal of the will is selfishness, and when the will
is once given up to sin, it is very natural to sin. The will
once committed to self-indulgence as its end, selfish actions
are in a sense spontaneous.
13. The doctrine of original sin, as held
by its advocates, must essentially modify the whole system of
practical theology. This will be seen as we proceed in our investigations.
14. The constitution of a moral being as a
whole, when all the powers are developed, does not tend to sin,
but strongly in an opposite direction; as is manifest from the
fact that when reason is thoroughly developed by the Holy Spirit,
it is more than a match for the sensibility, and turns the heart
to God.
15. The difficulty is, that the sensibility
gets the start of reason, and engages the attention in devising
means of self-gratification, and thus retards, and in a great
measure prevents, the development of the ideas of the reason
which were designed to control the will.
16. It is this morbid development that the
Holy Spirit is given to rectify, by so forcing truth upon the
attention, as to secure the development of the reason. By doing
this, He brings the will under the influence of truth. Our senses
reveal to us the objects correlated to our animal nature and
propensities. The Holy Spirit reveals God and the spiritual world,
and all that class of objects that are correlated to our higher
nature, so as to give reason the control of the will. This is
regeneration and sanctification, as we shall see in its proper
place."69
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"What the moral man above everything
has to do, is, recognizing the purely 'constitutional' nature
of his affectional movements, to abstract himself from them altogether,
and to determine all his activities by voluntary choices made
in view of the perception of the supreme intrinsic value of the
good of being. To be governed in any action whatever by our constitutional
affections, whatever they may be-whether what in the common estimation
would be called wicked or what in that estimation would be called
good, alike-is in view of the supreme obligation that rests upon
us to direct our activities to the one end of the good of being,
no longer merely unmoral but in the highest degree immoral. It
is preferring self-gratification to that benevolence which is
the sum of virtue."70 "Pure will plus external inducement-which
may be in the way of temptation to evil, or may be in the way
of incitement to good-that is all that comes into consideration
in our moral judgements."71
Quotes from Finney
"It matters not what kind of desire it
is; if it is the desire that governs the will this is selfishness.
It must be the will in a state of committal to the gratification
of the desire."72 "He may be prevented by a constitutional
or phrenological conscientiousness, or sense of justice. But
this is only a feeling of the sensibility, and, if restrained
only by this, he is just as absolutely selfish as if he had stolen
a horse in obedience to acquisitiveness."73 ". . .
if the selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be only
because, upon the whole, it was most pleasing or gratifying to
himself, and not at all for the sake of the good of being, as
an end. If he should become a pirate, it would be for exactly
the same reason, to wit, that this course is, upon the whole,
most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the
reason that that course is evil in itself. Whichever course he
takes, he takes it for precisely the same ultimate reason; and
with the same degree of light it must involve the same degree
of guilt."74
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
He admits that if a man pays his debts from
a sense of justice, or feeling of conscientiousness, he is therein
and therefore just as wicked as if he stole a horse. Or if man
preaches the gospel from a desire to glorify God and benefit
his fellow men, he is just as wicked for so doing as a pirate."75
"He was perfectly free to admit that we must begin by denying
the sinfulness of 'concupiscence,'[strong desire] if we are to
end by affirming 'entire sanctification.'"76
Analysis of arguments
In regard to the first inference above (Warfield
quoting from Hodge) I will provide Charles Hodge's actual statement
and Finney's response to that statement:
[Hodge]"Mr. Finney's principles lead
him to assert, that there is no difference in their feelings
between the renewed and the unrenewed, the sinner and the saint.
'The sensibility of the sinner,' he says, 'is susceptible of
every kind and degree of feeling that is possible to saints'.
He accordingly goes on to show, that sinners may desire sanctification,
delight in the truth, abhor sin, have complacency in good men,
entertain feelings of love and gratitude to God, and in short,
be as to feeling and conduct, exactly what saints are. The only
essential difference is in the will, in their ultimate purpose
or intention. The sinner's ultimate intention may be to promote
the glory of God, from a sense of duty, or from appreciation
of the loveliness of moral excellence and he be no better than
a pirate; if his ultimate end is to promote happiness because
happiness is intrinsically valuable, he is a saint."
[Finney]"This is a specimen of this writer's
reading and criticism. Here he represents me as holding the ridiculous
absurdity, that a sinner's ultimate intention may be to glorify
God from a sense of duty, or from an appreciation of the loveliness
of moral excellence; that is, his ultimate choice or intention
may be to glorify God, and yet this is not chosen as an end for
its own sake, but from a sense of duty, or from an apprehension
of the loveliness of moral excellence. He may choose the glory
of God for its own sake, and yet not for its own sake, but from
a sense of duty, etc. This is a ridiculous contradiction; and
if this writer had understood the book he was reviewing, he would
not have failed to see, that I again and again expose the very
absurdity which he here charges upon me. The thing I hold is,
not that the sinner's ultimate end may be the glory of God, and
it be as wicked as a pirate; but I say, that his ultimate end
may be selfish, and yet he may aim to do his duty as a means
of securing his own interest, or he may be selfish in aiming
to promote the glory of God, etc. Self may be his end, and duty
or aiming to glorify God a means. What a gross blunder for the
reviewer to represent me as holding, that the ultimate intention
may be to glorify God, and yet the glory of God not be his end,
but duty or something else be his end, or to represent me as
holding, that a man can be wicked at all when his ultimate end
is to glorify God. But as I said, this is but a specimen of the
misrepresentations of this reviewer."77
Regarding the second argument, Warfield is
right. Finney did hold that feelings and desires were not sinful
in and of themselves. Does Warfield disprove this or prove the
opposite? No, again. Finney summarizes below.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"What disobedience to moral law must
consist in: Disobedience to God's law must consist in the choice
of self-gratification as an end. In other words, it must consist
essentially in committing the will, and through the will committing
the whole being, to the indulgence of self-love, as the supreme
and ultimate end of life. This is selfishness. In other words,
it is seeking to gratify the desire of personal good, in a manner
prohibited by the law of God. It consists in choosing self-gratification
as an end, or for its own sake, instead of choosing, in accordance
with the law of the reason and of God, the highest well-being
of God and of the universe as an ultimate end. In other words
still, sin or disobedience to the moral law, consists in the
consecration of the heart and life to the gratification of the
constitutional and artificial desires, rather than in obedience
to the law of the intelligence. Or, once more, sin consists in
being governed by impulses of the sensibility [italics
mine], instead of being governed by the law of God, as it lies
revealed in the reason."78
"Selfishness consists in the obedience
of the will to the impulses of the sensibility. It is a spirit
of self-gratification. The will seeks to gratify the desires
and propensities, for the pleasure of the gratification. Self-gratification
is sought as an end, and as the supreme end. It is preferred
to the claims of God and the good of being. Phrenological, or
constitutional benevolence, is only obedience to the impulse
of the sensibility-a yielding to a feeling of compassion. It
is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really
selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire
whatever."79
"Some writers have fallen into the strange
mistake of making virtue to consist in seeking the gratification
of certain desires, because, as they say, these desires are virtuous.
They make some of the desires selfish, and some benevolent. To
yield the will to the control of the selfish propensities is
sin; to yield to the control of the benevolent desires, such
as the desire of my neighbor's happiness and of the public happiness,
is virtue, because these are good desires, while the selfish
desires are evil. Now this is, and has been, a very common view
of virtue and vice. But it is fundamentally erroneous. None of
the constitutional desires are good or evil in themselves; they
are alike involuntary, and all alike terminate on their correlated
objects. To yield the will to the control of any one of them,
no matter which, is sin; it is following a blind feeling, desire,
or impulse of the sensibility, instead of yielding to the demands
of the intelligence, as the law affirming power. To will the
good of my neighbor, or of my country, and of God, because of
the intrinsic value of those interests, that is to will them
as an end, and in obedience to the law of the reason, is virtue;
but to will them to gratify a constitutional but blind desire,
is selfishness and sin. The desires terminate on their respective
objects; but the will, in this case, seeks the objects, not for
their own sake, but because they are desired, that is, to gratify
the desires. This is choosing them, not as an end, but as a means
of self-gratification. This is making self-gratification the
end after all. This must be a universal truth, when a thing is
chosen merely in obedience to desire. The benevolence of these
writers is sheer selfishness, and their virtue is vice.
The choice of any thing whatever, because
it is desired, irrespective of the demands of the reason, is
selfishness and sin. It matters not what it is. The very statement,
that I choose a thing because I desire it, is only another form
of saying, that I choose it for my own sake, or for the sake
of appeasing the desire, and not on account of its own intrinsic
value. All such choice is always and necessarily partial. It
is giving one interest the preference over another, not because
of its perceived intrinsic and superior value, but because it
is an object of desire. If I yield to mere desire in any case,
it must be to gratify the desire. This is, and in the case supposed
must be, the end for which the choice is made. To deny this is
to deny that the will seeks the object because it is desired.
Partiality consists in giving one thing the preference of another
for no good reason. That is, not because the intelligence demands
this preference, but because the sensibility demands it. Partiality
is therefore always and necessarily an attribute of selfishness."80
REPROBATION
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"The ultimate result is that, representing
God as ordering the universe for the one end of the production
of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, he finds himself
teaching that men are left to perish solely for the enhancement
of the happiness of others."81 "What God has determining
regard to in His dealing with both alike, says Finney, is the
wise ordering of His government. He would prefer the salvation
of the reprobate, if-but only if-they could be saved consistently
with the wise government He has ordained."82
Quotes from Finney
"He knows, indeed, that His creating
them, together with His providential dispensations, will be the
occasion, not the cause, of their sin and consequent destruction."83
". . . He regards their destruction as a less evil to the
universe, than would be such a change in the administration and
arrangements of His government as would secure their salvation."84
"If He foresaw that, upon the whole, He could secure such
an amount of virtue and happiness by means of moral government,
as to more than counterbalance the sin and misery of those who
would be lost, then certainly it was a dictate of benevolence
to create them."85
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
"They are sacrificed thus to the good
of the universe, and perish not because justice demands that
they perish, but because it is better for others-surely not for
themselves-that they perish."86 "We may possibly be
able to bow before reasoning which is directed to show that our
reprobation is the unavoidable condition of the attainment of
an end high and holy enough to justify any individual evils which
are incurred in its achievement . . ." And, "But it
is not so easy to acquiesce when we are told that we must be
miserable that others may be happy. If the happiness of being
is the end to which everything is to give way, it is difficult
to see why we should be excluded from our fair share of it. Surely
at all events we must see the note of moral necessity, and not
that of a mere governmental expediency, in the transaction before
we can readily embrace it as just."87
Analysis of arguments
Warfield concludes that if God's intended
end in creation was the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
then men perish solely for this happiness and not due to justice
for voluntary acts. No reasoning for this conclusion is given.
It is an assumption that the answer can only be either/or and
not both/and (two-valued fallacy). In other words, why can't
happiness be the intended end AND men perish due to sinful choices.
Laws without sanction are only advisory. Sanctions help to secure
the intended end by demonstrating the seriousness of the lawmaker
and the goodness of the end sought. Sanctions (misery in hell,
etc.) are therefore a necessary means for producing the end.
Men are reprobated for actions of free-will,
not making use of the appointed means for their sanctification.
Reprobated because they are unwilling, not unwilling because
reprobated.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"Therefore, for their foreseen wickedness
and perseverance in rebellion, under circumstances the most favorable
to their virtue and salvation, in which He can wisely place them,
He is resolved upon their destruction; and has already in purpose
cast them off for ever."88
"Be it remembered, then, that the reason
why any are reprobated, is because they are unwilling to be saved;
that is, they are unwilling to be saved on the terms upon which
alone God can consistently save them. Ask sinners whether they
are willing to be saved, and they all say, yes; and with perfect
sincerity they may say this, if they can be saved upon their
own terms. But when you propose to them the terms of salvation
upon which the gospel proposes to save them; when they are required
to repent and believe the gospel, to forsake their sins, and
give themselves up to the service of God, they will with one
consent begin to make excuse. Now, to accept these terms, is
heartily and practically to consent to them. For them to say,
that they are willing to accept salvation, while they actually
do not accept it, is either to deceive themselves, or to utter
an infamous falsehood. To be willing is to accept it; and the
fact, that they do not heartily consent to, and embrace the terms
of salvation, is demonstration absolute, that they are unwilling.
Yes, sinners, the only terms on which you can possibly be saved,
you reject. Is it not then an insult to God for you to pretend
that you are willing? The only true reason why all of you are
not Christians, is that you are unwilling. You are not made unwilling
by any act of God, or because you are reprobate; but if you are
reprobate, it is because you are unwilling."89
REGENERATION
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"From this point of view also, he is
eager to show "not only that sanctification implies merely
'present obedience,' 'right volitions now,' and produces 'no
change of our nature so that we become good in ourselves,' but
that there is nothing 'in us,' antecedent to moral action, operating
as the occasion of sinful exercises, which needs to be eradicated
or changed in order to our being in a state of 'entire sanctification'";
and "to refute the doctrine, that apart from present transgressions,
'there might be that in a person which would lay the foundation
for his sinning at a future time.'"90 "If there is
nothing in us from which we need to be saved except our 'commitment
to self-gratification as the end of our being,' it is easier
to believe that the passage from the one to the other-being only
a passage from one purpose to another-may be made absolutely
all at once;"91
Quotes from Finney
"Those persons who maintain the sinfulness
of the constitutional appetites, must of course deny that man
can ever be entirely sanctified in this life."92 "Neither
God, nor any other being, can regenerate him, if he will not
turn. If he will not change his choice, it is impossible that
it should be changed."93 ". . . implies an entire present
change of moral character, that is, a change from entire sinfulness
to entire holiness."94
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
". . . absolutely all that happens to
him is a change of purpose." And, "We regenerate ourselves:
only the man himself can 'change his choice,'"95 "It
is quite clear that what Finney gives us is less a theology than
a system of morals. God might be eliminated from it entirely
without essentially changing its character. All virtue, all holiness,
is made to consist in an ethical determination of will."96
Analysis of arguments
God calls, man voluntarily responds; so taught
Finney. Warfield claims that this means that man regenerates
himself. The issue is whether or not man is active in regeneration.
Warfield suggests that a claim of voluntariness on the part of
man negates all other activity in the face of Finney's clear
distinctions to the contrary (See Finney's conclusion). Warfield
makes a false issue by claiming a cause and effect relationship
between Finney's view (voluntariness) and Warfield's conclusion
(man regenerates self). This is a bare assertion with no supporting
argument.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"The theologians whose views we are canvassing,
maintain that the appetites, passions, desires, and propensities,
which are constitutional and entirely involuntary, are in themselves
sinful. To this I reply, that Adam and Eve possessed them before
they fell. Christ possessed them, or He was not a man, nor, in
any proper sense, a human being. No, these appetites, passions,
and propensities, are not sinful, though they are the occasions
of sin. They are a temptation to the will to seek their unlawful
indulgence. When these lusts or appetites are spoken of as the
"passions of sin," or as "sinful lusts or passions,"
it is not because they are sinful in themselves, but because
they are the occasions of sin. It has been asked, Why are not
the appetites and propensities to be regarded as sinful, since
they are the prevalent temptations to sin? I reply:
They are involuntary, and moral character
can no more be predicated of them, on account of their being
temptations, than it could of the fruit that was a temptation
to Eve. They have no design to tempt. They are constitutional,
unintelligent, involuntary; and it is impossible that moral character
should be predicable of them. A moral agent is responsible for
his emotions, desires, etc., so far as they are under the direct
or indirect control of his will, and no further. He is always
responsible for the manner in which he gratifies them. If he
indulges them in accordance with the law of God, he does right.
If he makes their gratification his end, he sins."97
"In regeneration the subject is both
passive and active:
1. That he is active is plain from what has
been said, and from the very nature of the change.
2. That he is, at the same time, passive,
is plain from the fact that he acts only when and as he is acted
upon. That is he is passive in the perception of the truth presented
by the Holy Spirit. I know that this perception is no part of
regeneration. But it is simultaneous with regeneration. It induces
regeneration. It is the condition and the occasion of regeneration.
Therefore the subject of regeneration must be a passive recipient
or percipient of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit, at the
moment, and during the act of regeneration. The Spirit acts upon
him through or by the truth: thus far he is passive. He closes
with the truth: thus far he is active. What a mistake those theologians
have fallen into who represent the subject as altogether passive
in regeneration! This rids the sinner at once of the conviction
of any duty or responsibility about it. It is wonderful that
such an absurdity should have been so long maintained in the
church. But while it is maintained, it is no wonder that sinners
are not converted to God. While the sinner believes this, it
is impossible, if he has it in mind, that he should be regenerated.
He stands and waits for God to do what God requires him to do,
and which no one can do for him. Neither God, nor any other being,
can regenerate him, if he will not turn. If he will not change
his choice, it is impossible that it should be changed. Sinners
who have been taught thus and have believed what they have been
taught, would never have been regenerated had not the Holy Spirit
drawn off their attention from this error, and ere they were
aware, induced them to close in with the offer of life."98
"What is implied in regeneration:
1. The nature of the change shows that it
must be instantaneous. It is a change of choice, or of intention.
This must be instantaneous. The preparatory work of conviction
and enlightening the mind may have been gradual and progressive.
But when regeneration occurs, it must be instantaneous.
2. It implies an entire present change of
moral character, that is, a change from entire sinfulness to
entire holiness. We have seen that it consists in a change from
selfishness to benevolence. We have also seen that selfishness
and benevolence cannot coexist in the same mind; that selfishness
is a state of supreme and entire consecration to self; that benevolence
is a state of entire and supreme consecration to God and the
good of the universe. Regeneration, then, surely implies an entire
change of moral character.
Again: the Bible represents regeneration as
a dying to sin and becoming alive to God. Death in sin is total
depravity. This is generally admitted. Death to sin and becoming
alive to God, must imply entire present holiness.
3. The scriptures represent regeneration as
the condition of salvation in such a sense, that if the subject
should die immediately after regeneration, and without any further
change, he would go immediately to heaven.
Again: the scriptures require only perseverance
in the first love, as the condition of salvation, in case the
regenerate soul should live long in the world subsequently to
regeneration.
4. When the scriptures require us to grow
in grace, and in the knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, this
does not imply that there is yet sin remaining in the regenerate
heart which we are required to put away by degrees. But the spirit
of the requirement must be, that we should acquire as much knowledge
as we can of our moral relations, and continue to conform to
all truth as fast as we know it. This, and nothing else, is implied
in abiding in our first love, or abiding in Christ, living and
walking in the Spirit."99
SANCTIFICATION
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"The supreme ultimate end to which in
the right exercise of our will we must direct ourselves, if we
would be virtuous or holy-these things are one-is the good of
being. God is of course included in this being, but only as part
of the whole-Being-to which our benevolent purpose is directed."100
" . . . identification of 'benevolence' and 'obedience'
does not appear obvious to the uninstructed mind and requires
some explication. Finney discovers the intermediating idea in
. . . adoption of His end as our end . . . "101 "In
that case the essence of true religion is obedience; and it can
be benevolence only as obedience can be construed as rendered,
not because it is due, but out of good will;" And, "Religion
being obedience, it is distinctly a matter of will, and also
of conduct, the product of will. Voluntary subjection is its
form, although the form of this subjection is described as the
adoption of the Divine end as our own and the prosecution of
it (always under the Divine prescription) with all our might."102
"Everything that the Spirit does for us is thus reduced
to enlightenment; everything we receive from Him to knowledge.
We are exhorted, it is true, to renounce our own strength and
rely on, draw on, live by the strength of Christ."103 "The
precise thing he asserts is that sanctification is by faith as
opposed to works." And, "We believe in Christ for our
sanctification; He then acts persuasively in our souls for sanctification;
under this persuasion we act holily; that is our sanctification.
It is all a sanctification of acts. We are not ourselves cleansed;
but then there is no need of cleansing us, since we are never
ourselves unclean. We were only a bundle of constitutional appetites,
passions, and propensities, innocent in themselves, which we
have been misusing through a bad will. What needs correcting
is only this bad will into a good one. And the appropriate, the
only instrument for the correction of our willing is a persuasion.
Moved by this persuasion we 'make ourselves a good heart'-we
'change our mind,' as the phrase goes-and that is the whole of
it."104
Quotes from Finney
"It consists in consecration to the right
end; to the end to which God is consecrated."105 ".
. . all holiness . . . [consists in] the right exercise of our
own will or agency"106 "True religion consists in benevolence,
or in heart obedience to God."107 "It should never
be forgotten, that all true religion consists in voluntary states
of mind, and that the true and only way to attain to true religion,
is to look at and understand the exact thing to be done, and
then to put forth at once the voluntary exercise required."108
"It ascribes the whole of salvation and sanctification from
first to last, not only till the soul is sanctified, but at every
moment while it remains in that state, to the indwelling spirit,
and influence, and grace of Christ. A state of entire
sanctification can never be attained by an indifferent waiting
of God's time. Nor by any works of law, or works of any kind,
performed in your own strength, irrespective of the grace of
God. By this I do not mean, that, were you disposed to exert
your natural powers aright, you could not at once obey the law
in the exercise of your natural strength, and continue to do
so. But I do mean, that as you are wholly indisposed to use your
natural powers aright, without the grace of God, no efforts that
you will actually make in your own strength, or independent of
His grace, will ever result in your entire sanctification."109
"By the assertion, that the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of
Christ, is received by faith, to reign in the heart, it is intended,
that He is actually trusted in, or submitted to by faith, and
His influence suffered to control us. He does not guide and control
us, by irresistible power or force, but faith confides the guidance
of our souls to Him. Faith receives and confides in Him, and
consents to be governed and directed by Him. As His influence
is moral, and not physical, it is plain that he can influence
us no further . . . than we trust or confide in Him."110
"The Holy Spirit controls, guides, and sanctifies the soul,
not by a physical influence, nor by impulses nor by impressions
made on the sensibility, but by enlightening and convincing the
intellect, and thus quickening the conscience."111 Rely
on Christ not "in the antinomian, do-nothing, sit-still
sense . . . but upon Christ, as a helpless man would lean upon
the arm or shoulder of a strong man, to be borne about in some
benevolent enterprise."112 "That is, faith receives
Christ in all His offices, and in all the fullness of His relations
to the soul; and Christ, when received, works in the soul to
will and to do of all His good pleasure, not by a physical, but
by a moral or persuasive working."113
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
"We are all, He and we, members of one
ethical body, governed by one ethical law, and pursuing a common
ethical course. But since the same law governs God and us, it
is clear that we are dealing with pure ethics, not religion."
And, " . . . God cannot be held to be the sole or even the
chief object included under the term, 'Being,' the good of which
is our supreme ultimate end."114 "Finney constantly
employs the double phrase, 'God and the universe' as the synonym
of Being in this reference; and we may think it possible that
he wished the two elements in the composite idea to be distributed
differently in our case and in God's-that in our case it should
be God along with the universe, in God's, the universe along
of course with Himself-as even we include ourselves in the Being
whose good we seek. But can we even imagine God taking a subordinate
place in His own eyes, attributing 'greater intrinsic value'
. . . to the universe than to His own all glorious Being? Must
not His own glory be to Him also, as it must be to us, His supreme
ultimate end?"115 "The adoption of the end of God as
our end, and obedience to the will of God, are not quite the
same conception: they are assimilated to one another by the requirement
that we shall prosecute this end when adopted in implicit obedience
to the Divine prescription. Clearly this is a religion of law,
and the heart of it is obedience: and these are ethical conceptions."116
"A perfectionism is asserted here of every true Christian,
from the inception of his Christianity; a perfectionism resting
absolutely on the sinner's own ultimate choice."117 "We
do not need Christ's strength: we have enough of our own. We
need from Christ only an adequate inducement to use our own strength
aright."118 "You see, nothing but better knowledge
is required; better knowledge leads to a better life. The ministrations
of the Holy Ghost are, to be sure, not excluded; but the whole
work of the Spirit is reduced to the mode of illumination. All
that the Spirit does is to give the sinner a better view of the
claims of God."119
Analysis of arguments
If the same law (disinterested benevolence)
governs God and man how does it follow that this is ethics and
not religion? Warfield, of course, does not tell. He merely asserts.
Finney did not claim that God was/is required to take a subordinate
position to the universe. This is a misrepresentation. Concerning
God's end, etc.: God's will is God's intended end, how can they
be separate? Again, Warfield makes a bare assertion with no argument.
Does repentance and conversion imply sanctification?
Finney said yes. Does this sanctification rest solely
on the sinner's own ultimate choice? Finney said NO! Finney made
the distinction that man's choice was a condition of perfection
but, that man was dependent on the Holy Spirit and Christ. Warfield
would have one believe that if you speak of man acting at all,
you have therefore taken God out of the picture. This does not
follow.
Finney says, ""The Holy Spirit controls,
guides, and sanctifies the soul . . . by enlightening and convincing
the intellect, and thus quickening the conscience." Warfield
represents this as nothing but "better knowledge."
Convincing the intellect speaks of persuasion, not information;
argument, not knowledge. Quickening the conscience is knowledge?
Warfield overlooks these distinctions that Finney was careful
to make.
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"It [grace] has made no provision to
secure holiness without the right exercise of our own will or
agency."120
"1. There is an importance to be attached
to the sanctification of the body, of which very few persons
appear to be aware. Indeed, unless the bodily appetites and powers
be consecrated to the service of God-unless we learn to eat,
and drink, and sleep, and wake, and labor, and rest, for the
glory of God, permanent sanctification as a practical thing is
out of the question. It is plain, that very few persons are aware
of the great influence which their bodies have over their minds,
and of the indispensable necessity of bringing their bodies under,
and keeping them in subjection.
Few people seem to keep the fact steadily
in view, that unless their bodies be rightly managed, they will
be so fierce and overpowering a source of temptation to the mind,
as inevitably to lead it into sin. If they indulge themselves
in a stimulating diet, and in the use of those condiments that
irritate and rasp the nervous system, their bodies will be, of
course and of necessity, the source of powerful and incessant
temptation to evil tempers and vile affections. If persons were
aware of the great influence which the body has over the mind,
they would realize, that they cannot be too careful to preserve
the nervous system from the influence of every improper article
of food or drink, and preserve that system as they would the
apple of their eye, from every influence that could impair its
functions. No one who has opportunity to acquire information
in regard to the laws of life and health, and the best means
of sanctifying the whole spirit, soul, and body, can be guiltless
if he neglects these means of knowledge. Every man is bound to
make the structure and laws of both body and mind the subject
of as thorough investigation as his circumstances will permit,
to inform himself in regard to what are the true principles of
perfect temperance, and in what way the most can be made of all
his powers of body and mind for the glory of God.
2. From what has been said in these lectures,
the reason why the church has not been entirely sanctified is
very obvious. As a body the church has not believed that such
a state was attainable until near the close of life. And this
is a sufficient reason, and indeed the most weighty of all reasons,
for her not having attained it.
3. From what has been said, it is easy to
see, that the true question in regard to entire sanctification
in this life is: Is it attainable as a matter of fact? Some have
thought the proper question to be: Are Christians entirely sanctified
in this life? Now certainly this is not the question that needs
to be discussed. Suppose it to be fully granted that they are
not; this fact is sufficiently accounted for, by the consideration
that they do not know or believe it to be attainable until the
close of life. If they believed it to be attainable, it might
no longer be true that they do not attain it. But if provision
really is made for this attainment, it amounts to nothing, unless
it be recognized and believed. The thing needed then is, to bring
the church to see and believe, that this is her high privilege
and her duty. It is not enough, as has been shown, to say that
it is attainable, simply on the ground of natural ability. This
is as true of the devil, and the lost in hell, as of men in this
world. But unless grace has put this attainment so within our
reach, as that it may be aimed at with the reasonable prospect
of success, there is, as a matter of fact, no more provision
for our entire sanctification in this life, than for the devil's.
As has been said, it seems to be trifling with mankind, merely
to maintain the attainability of this state, on the ground of
natural ability only, and at the same time to tell them, that
they certainly never will exercise this ability unless disposed
to do so by the grace of God; and furthermore, that it is a dangerous
error for us to expect to receive grace from God to secure this
result; that we might by natural possibility make this attainment,
but it is irrational and dangerous error to expect or hope to
make it, or hope to receive sufficient grace to secure it.
The real question is, has grace brought this
attainment so within our reach, that we may reasonably expect,
by aiming at it, to experience it in this life? It is admitted,
that on the ground of natural ability, both wicked men and devils
have the power to be entirely holy. But it is also admitted that
their indisposition to use this power aright is so complete,
that as a matter of fact, they never will, unless influenced
to do so by the grace of God. I insist therefore that the real
question is, whether the provisions of the gospel are such, that
did the church fully understand and lay hold upon the proffered
grace, she might attain this state? Are we as fully authorized
to offer this grace to Christians, as we are the grace of repentance
and pardon to sinners? May we as consistently urge Christians
to lay hold on sanctifying grace sufficient to keep them from
all sin, as to urge sinners to lay hold of Christ for justification?
May we insist upon the one as really and as honestly as the other?
4. We see how irrelevant and absurd the objection
is, that as a matter of fact the church has not attained this
state, and therefore it is not attainable. Why, if they have
not understood it to be attainable, it no more disproves its
attainableness, than the fact that the heathen have not embraced
the gospel, proves that they will not when they know it. Within
my memory it was thought to be dangerous to call sinners to repent
and believe the gospel; and on the contrary, they were told by
Calvinists, that they could not repent, that they must wait God's
time; and it was regarded as a dangerous error for a sinner to
think that he could repent. But who does not know, that the thorough
inculcation of an opposite doctrine has brought scores of thousands
to repentance? Now the same course needs to be pursued with Christians.
Instead of being told, that it is dangerous to expect to be entirely
sanctified in this life, they ought to be taught to believe at
once, and take hold on the promises of perfect love and faith.
5. You see the necessity of fully preaching
and insisting upon this doctrine, and of calling it by its true
scriptural name. It is astonishing to see to what an extent there
is a tendency among men to avoid the use of scriptural language,
and to cleave to the language of such men as Edwards, and other
great and good divines. They object to the terms perfection and
entire sanctification, and prefer to use the terms entire consecration,
and such other terms as have been common in the church.
Now, I would by no means contend about the
use of words; but still it does appear to me to be of great importance,
that we use scripture language, and insist upon men being "perfect
as their Father in heaven is perfect" (Matt. 5:48), and
being "sanctified wholly, body, soul and spirit" (1
Thess. 5:23). This appears to me to be the more important for
this reason, that if we use the language to which the church
has been accustomed upon this subject, she will, as she has done,
misunderstand us, and will not get before her mind that which
we really mean. That this is so, is manifest from the fact, that
the great mass of the church will express alarm at the use of
the terms perfection and entire sanctification, who will neither
express nor feel any such alarm, if we speak of entire consecration.
This demonstrates, that they do not by any means understand these
terms as meaning the same thing. And although I understand them
as meaning precisely the same thing, yet I find myself obliged
to use the terms perfection and entire sanctification to possess
their minds of their real meaning. This is Bible language. It
is unobjectionable language. And inasmuch as the church understands
entire consecration to mean something less than entire sanctification
or Christian perfection, it does seem to me of great importance,
that ministers should use a phraseology which will call the attention
of the church to the real doctrine of the Bible upon this subject.
With great humility, I would submit the question to my beloved
brethren in the ministry, whether they are not aware, that Christians
have entirely too low an idea of what is implied in entire consecration,
and whether it is not useful and best to adopt a phraseology
in addressing them, that shall call their attention to the real
meaning of the words which they use?
6. Young converts have not been allowed so
much as to indulge the thought that they could live even for
a day wholly without sin. They have as a general thing no more
been taught to expect to live even for a day without sin, than
they have been taught to expect immediate translation, soul and
body, to heaven. Of course, they have not known that there was
any other way than to go on in sin; and however shocking and
distressing the necessity has appeared to them, in the ardor
of their first love, still they have looked upon it as an unalterable
fact, that to be in a great measure in bondage to sin is a thing
of course while they live in this world. Now, with such an orthodoxy
as this, with the conviction in the church and ministry so ripe,
settled and universal, that the utmost that the grace of God
can do for men in this world is to bring them to repentance,
and to leave them to live and die in a state of sinning and repenting,
is it at all wonderful, that the state of religion should be
as it really has been?
In looking over the results to Christians,
of preaching the doctrine in question, I feel compelled to say,
that so far as all observation can go, I have the same evidence
that it is truth, and as such is owned and blessed of God to
the elevation of the holiness of Christians, as I have, that
those are truths which I have so often preached to sinners, and
which have been blessed of God to their conversion. This doctrine
seems as naturally calculated to elevate the piety of Christians,
and as actually to result in the elevation of their piety, under
the blessing of God, as those truths that I have preached to
sinners were to their conversion.
7. Christ has been in a great measure lost
sight of in some of His most important relations to mankind.
He has been known and preached as a pardoning and justifying
Savior; but as an actually indwelling and reigning Savior in
the heart, he has been but little known. I was struck with a
remark a few years since, of a brother whom I have from that
time greatly loved, who had been for a time in a desponding state
of mind, borne down with a great sense of his own vileness, but
seeing no way of escape. At an evening meeting the Lord so revealed
Himself to him, as entirely to overcome the strength of his body,
and his brethren were obliged to carry him home. The next time
I saw him, he exclaimed to me with a pathos I shall never forget,
"Brother Finney, the church have buried the Savior."
Now it is no doubt true, that the church have become awfully
alienated from Christ-have in a great measure lost a knowledge
of what He is, and ought to be, to her; and a great many of her
members, I have good reason to know, in different parts of the
country, are saying with deep and overpowering emotion, "They
have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid
Him" (John 20:13)." And,
"16. Much pains have been taken to demonstrate,
that our views of this subject are wrong. But in all the arguing
to this end hitherto, there has been one grand defect. None of
the opponents of this doctrine have yet showed us "a more
excellent way, and told us what is right" (1 Cor. 12:31).
It is certainly impossible to ascertain what is wrong, on any
moral subject, unless we have before us the standard of right.
The mind must certainly be acquainted with the rule of right,
before it can reasonably pronounce anything wrong: "for
by the law is the knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:20). It is
therefore certainly absurd, for the opponents of the doctrine
of entire sanctification in this life, to pronounce this doctrine
wrong without being able to show us what is right. To what purpose,
then, I pray, do they argue, who insist upon this view of the
subject as wrong, while they do not so much as attempt to tell
us what is right? It cannot be pretended, that the scriptures
teach nothing upon this subject. And the question is, what do
they teach? We therefore call upon the denouncers of this doctrine,
and we think the demand reasonable, to inform us definitely,
how holy Christians may be, and are expected to be in this life.
And it should be distinctly understood, that until they bring
forward the rule laid down in the scripture upon this subject,
it is but arrogance to pronounce anything wrong; just as if they
should pronounce anything to be sin without comparing it with
the standard of right. Until they inform us what the scriptures
do teach, we must beg leave to be excused from supposing ourselves
obliged to believe, that what is taught in these lectures is
wrong, or contrary to the language and spirit of inspiration.
This is certainly a question that ought not to be thrown loosely
aside, without being settled. The thing at which we aim is, to
establish a definite rule, or to explain what we suppose to be
the real and explicit teachings of the Bible upon this point.
And we do think it absurd, that the opponents of this view should
attempt to convince us of error, without so much as attempting
to show what the truth upon this subject is. As if we could easily
enough decide what is contrary to right, without possessing any
knowledge of right. We therefore beseech our brethren, In discussing
this subject, to show us what is right. And if this is not the
truth, to show us a more excellent way, and convince us that
we are wrong, by showing us what is right. For we have no hope
of ever seeing that we are wrong, until we can see that something
else than what is advocated in this discussion, is right."121
ELECTION
Warfield's representations of Finney's
view
"So far as this representation goes,
God's entire action is determined by His creatures: He finds
Himself (in His foresight) with an apostate race on His hands;
an apostate race of whom He can 'wisely'-a 'wisely' which in
Finney's scheme means ultimately 'benevolently'-save only a part;
and His choice of the part He will save is determined immediately
by them and not by Himself."122 " . . . a description
of God's mode of action under His decree of salvation. This action
is summed up in the institution of a system of means to effect
the end in view . . . These means are the law, the atonement
and mediatorial work of Christ, the publication of the Gospel
and God's providential and moral government-and also 'the gift
and agency of the Holy Spirit.'"123 " . . . grace has
made sufficient provision to make the salvation of all men possible
. . . and that of a portion of mankind certain: and this is followed
by the declaration that all who have the Gospel are without excuse,
if they are not saved-another barren statement . . . "124
"What He does, it is affirmed, is effective to the end in
the case of those whose salvation He conceives it 'wise' to 'secure.'"125
"According to him election proceeds on the foresight of
salvability; but he does not suppose that the same grace is given
to all men alike-although all receive 'sufficient grace'-but
that God employs in each case whatever grace it seems to Him
wise to employ in order to accomplish His end. Those that are
salvable-that is, those that are salvable under the wise government
which He has established-He secures the salvation of. Those who,
under this wise government, are not salvable, He leaves in their
sins. Those whose salvation He undertakes to secure, because
they are salvable under the wise government He has established,
He brings to salvation by suasive influences of grace, adapted
in each case to their special needs, and therefore certain to
be effective. These are the elect."126 " . . . the
reason, or one of the reasons, why just those who are elected
are elected, is that they, and not others, would be saved under
the system of government which God had in mind to establish.
He was bound to elect those and not others-or else alter the
system of government He had it in mind to establish, under which
none others could be saved; and He cannot alter this system of
government because it is the wisest and best system."127
Quotes from Finney
"God foresaw that all mankind would fall
into a state of total alienation from Him and His government.
He also foresaw that by the wisest arrangement, He could secure
the return and salvation of a part of mankind. He resolved to
do so, and 'chose them to eternal salvation, through sanctification
of the Spirit and belief of the truth.'"128 "Grace
has made the salvation of every human being secure, who can be
persuaded, by all the influences that God can wisely bring to
bear upon him, to accept the offers of salvation."129 "The
best system of means for securing the great end of benevolence,
included the election of just those who were elected, and no
others . . . The highest good demanded it."130 "I suppose
that God bestows on men unequal measures of gracious influence,
but that in this there is nothing arbitrary; that on the contrary,
He sees the wisest and best reasons for this; that being in justice
under obligation to none, He exercises His own benevolent discretion,
in bestowing on all as much gracious influence as He sees to
be upon the whole wise and good, and enough to throw the entire
responsibility of their damnation upon them if they are lost.
But upon some He foresaw that He could wisely bestow a sufficient
measure of gracious influence to secure their voluntary yielding,
and upon others He could not bestow enough in fact to secure
this result."131 "The elect were chosen to eternal
life upon condition that God foresaw that in the perfect exercise
of their freedom, they could be induced to repent and embrace
the gospel."132
Arguments, inferences and conclusions adduced
by Warfield
"In this whole statement the greatest
care is expended in making it clear that all that God does toward
saving men is directed to inducing the objects of salvation to
save themselves."133 " . . . they are elected on the
ground of their salvability-under the wise government which God
has established. There is no sovereignty exhibited in their election
itself, except in the sense that God might have left them also
in their sin; if He were to save any, these were the only ones
He could save-under the wise government established by Him."134
"The determining characteristic of the elect on this view,
we presume, is that, in nature, character, situation, circumstances-in
their totality, considered in all relations-the salvation of
just these and none others serves as a means to God's ultimate
supreme end-the good of being. Not merely the salvation of some
rather than others, but the salvation of just these same rather
than any others, subserves this end."135 "God elects
those whom He can save, and leaves unelected those whom
He cannot save, consistently with the system of government
which He has determined to establish as the wisest and best.
And this seems strongly to suggest that there is an intrinsic
difference between the objects of election and others, determining
their different treatment." And, "The ground of His
election of just them is that there is something in them or in
their relations to His system of government of the world, which
makes it wise to save them; and this is not true of the others."136
"It appears that Finney wishes to make it appear that election
is in some sense the cause of salvation. But he is hampered by
his preconceptions. He wishes to deny that election is 'arbitrary.'
He wishes to represent salvation as depending on the 'voluntary'
action of men."137
Analysis of arguments
Warfield represents Finney as holding that
man saves himself. Man's choice is the condition of salvation,
God's mercy the grounds. Does God save man against his will?
" . . . they are elected on the ground
of their salvability" NO! This does not follow from Finney's
statements, nor does Warfield demonstrate a connection.
"God elects those whom He can
save" NO! God elects those whom He can wisely save. This
is Finney's view. Warfield once again makes a false issue by
ignoring Finney's careful distinctions. Salvability is a
condition of election, not the cause.
Warfield speaks to an unstated intention of
Finney with "Finney wishes to make it appear that election
is in some sense the cause of salvation." Does Warfield
explain how he draws this inference? Does he show how it follows
from Finney's statements?
Finney's conclusions on the same subject
"It is, that all of Adam's race, who
are or ever will be saved, were from eternity chosen by God to
eternal salvation, through the sanctification of their hearts
by faith in Christ. In other words, they are chosen to salvation
by means of sanctification. Their salvation is the end-their
sanctification is a means. Both the end and the means are elected,
appointed, chosen; the means as really as the end, and for the
sake of the end. The election of some individuals and nations
to certain privileges, and to do certain things, is not the kind
of election of which I treat at this time; but I am to consider
the doctrine of election as it respects election unto salvation,
as just explained."138
"God was under obligation to no one-He
might in perfect justice have sent all mankind to hell. The doctrine
of election will damn no one: by treating the non-elect according
to their deserts, He does them no injustice; and surely His exercising
grace in the salvation of the elect, is no act of injustice to
the non-elect; and especially will this appear to be true, if
we take into consideration the fact, that the only reason why
the non-elect will not be saved is, because they pertinaciously
refuse salvation. He offers mercy to all. The atonement is sufficient
for all. All may come, and are under an obligation to be saved.
He strongly desires their salvation, and does all that He wisely
can to save them. Why then should the doctrine of election be
thought unjust?
To this paragraph it has been objected as
follows: "Can it be said, that the only reason why the non-elect
are not saved is their rejection of salvation, etc? Is there
not a reason back of this? God does not give that gracious influence
in their case, which He does in the case of the elect. If the
only reason why the non-elect are not saved is their pertinacious
refusal, then it would follow that the only reason why the elect
are saved, is their acceptance of salvation. If these two points
are so, then why all this discussion about election to salvation,
and the means to that end, and God's reason for electing? The
whole matter would resolve itself into free will, and God would
stand quite independent of the issue in every case. Then would
there be no such thing as election." The objection contains
a non sequitur.
I say, the only reason why the non-elect are
not saved, is because they pertinaciously refuse salvation. But
if this is true, he says, "it will follow that the only
reason why the elect are saved, is their acceptance of salvation."
But this does not follow. The non-elect fail of salvation only
because they resist all the grace that God can wisely bestow
upon them. This grace they resist, and fail of salvation. It
is no more reasonable to say, that God's not giving them more
divine influence to convert them "is a reason back of this,"
than it would be to say that His not having by a gracious influence,
restrained them from sin altogether, is "a reason back of"
their pertinacious resistance of grace. If the non-elect are
lost, or fail of salvation only because they resist all the grace
that God can wisely bestow, it would not follow that the only
reason why the elect are saved, is because they accept, or yield
to the same measure of gracious influence as that bestowed upon
the non-elect, for it may be, and in many cases the fact is,
that God does bestow more gracious influence on the elect, than
on the non-elect, because He can wisely do so. Here then is a
plain non sequitur. Observe, I am writing in the paragraph in
question upon the justice of the divine proceeding. I say, that
so far as this is concerned, he fails of salvation, not because
God withholds the grace that He could wisely bestow, but only
because he rejects the grace proffered, and all that can be wisely
proffered.
If I understand this objector, there is another
non sequitur in his objection. I understand him to say,
that upon the supposition that the elect and the non-elect have
the same measure of gracious influence, and that the reason why
the elect are saved, and the non-elect not saved is, that the
elect yield to, and the non-elect resist this influence; the
whole question resolves into free will, and there is no election
about it. If this is his meaning, as I think it must be, it is
a plain non sequitur. Suppose God foresaw that this would be
so, and in view of this foreseen fact elected those who He foresaw
would yield both to the privileges and gracious influence to
which He foresaw they would yield, and to salvation as a consequence
of this influence and yielding. And suppose He foresaw that the
non-elect, although ordained or elected to enjoy the same measure
of gracious influence, would resist and reject salvation, and
for this cause rejected or reprobated them in His eternal purpose.
Would not this be election? To be sure, in this case the different
results would turn upon the fact that the elect yielded, and
the non-elect did not yield, to the same measure of gracious
influence. But there would be an election of the one to eternal
life, and a rejection of the other. I cannot see how this objector
can say, that in this case there could be no election, unless
in his idea of election there is the exercise of an arbitrary
sovereignty. I suppose that God bestows on men unequal measures
of gracious influence, but that in this there is nothing arbitrary;
that, on the contrary, He sees the wisest and best reasons for
this; that being in justice under obligation to none, He exercises
His own benevolent discretion, in bestowing on all as much gracious
influence as He sees to be upon the whole wise and good, and
enough to throw the entire responsibility of their damnation
upon them if they are lost. But upon some He foresaw that He
could wisely bestow a sufficient measure of gracious influence
to secure their voluntary yielding, and upon others He could
not bestow enough in fact to secure this result. In accordance
with this foreknowledge, He chose the elect to both the gracious
influence and its results, eternal life. In all this there was
nothing arbitrary or unjust. He does all for all that He wisely
can. He does enough for all to leave them without excuse. If
the non-elect would yield to that measure of gracious influence
which He can and does bestow upon them, which is the best He
can do without acting unwisely, and of course wickedly, they
would be saved. To this they might yield. To this they ought
to yield. God has no right to do more than He does for them,
all things considered; and there is no reason of which they can
justly complain why they are not saved. They can with no more
reason complain of His not giving them more gracious influence
than that He created them, or that He made them free agents,
or that He did not restrain them from sin altogether, or do anything
else which it had been unwise, and therefore wrong to have done.
Nor is the fact that God does not bestow on them sufficient grace
to secure their yielding and salvation, a "reason back of
their obstinacy to which their not being saved is to be ascribed,"
any more than any one of the above-named things is such a reason.
This objection proceeds upon the assumption,
that election must be unconditional to be election at all-that
election must be so defined, as to be the cause of the difference
in the eternal state of the elect and non-elect. But I see not
why election may not be conditioned upon the foreseen fact, that
the wisest possible administration of moral government would
secure the free concurrence of some, and not of others. What
could be wisely done being foreseen, the purpose that so it should
be done would be election. No man has a right to define the terms
election and reprobation in such a sense, as to exclude all conditions,
and then insist that conditional election is no election at all."139
"Inferences and remarks:
1. Foreknowledge and election are not inconsistent
with free agency. The elect were chosen to eternal life, upon
condition that God foresaw that in the perfect exercise of their
freedom, they could be induced to repent and embrace the gospel.
2. You see why many persons are opposed to
the doctrine of election, and try to explain it away; 1st, they
misunderstand it, and 2nd, they deduce unwarrantable inferences
from it. They suppose it to mean, that the elect will be saved
at all events, whatever their conduct may be; and again, they
infer from the doctrine that there is no possibility of the salvation
of the non-elect. The doctrine, as they understand it, would
be an encouragement to the elect to persevere in sin, knowing
that their salvation was sure, and their inference would drive
the non-elect to desperation, on the ground that for them to
make efforts to be saved would be of no avail. But both the doctrine,
as they understand it, and the inference, are false. For election
does not secure the salvation of the elect irrespective of their
character and conduct; nor, as we have seen, does it throw any
obstacle in the way of the salvation of the non-elect.
3. This view of the subject affords no ground
for presumption on the one hand, nor for despair upon the other.
No one can justly say, If I am to be saved I shall be saved,
do what I will. Nor can any one say, If I am to be damned I shall
be damned, do what I will. But the question is left, so far as
they are concerned, as a matter of entire contingency. Sinners,
your salvation or damnation is as absolutely suspended upon your
own choice, as if God neither knew nor designed anything about
it.
4. This doctrine lays no foundation for a
controversy with God. But on the other hand, it does lay a broad
foundation for gratitude, both on the part of the elect and non-elect.
The elect certainly have great reason for thankfulness, that
they are thus distinguished. Oh, what a thought, to have your
name written in the book of life, to be chosen of God an heir
of eternal salvation, to be adopted into His family, to be destined
to enjoy His presence, and to bathe your soul in the boundless
ocean of His love for ever and ever! Now are the non-elect without
obligations of thankfulness. You ought to be grateful, if any
of your brethren of the human family are saved. If all were lost,
God would be just. And if any of this dying world receive the
gift of eternal life, you ought to be grateful, and render everlasting
thanks to God.
5. The non-elect often enjoy as great or greater
privileges than the elect. Many men have lived and died under
the sound of the gospel, have enjoyed all the means of salvation
during a long life, and have at last died in their sins, while
others have been converted upon their first hearing the gospel
of God. Nor is this difference owing to the fact, that the elect
always have more of the strivings of the Spirit than the non-elect.
Many who die in their sins, appear to have had conviction for
a great part of their lives; have often been deeply impressed
with a strong sense of their sins and the value of their souls,
but have strongly entrenched themselves under refuges of lies,
have loved the world and hated God, and fought their way through
all the obstacles that were thrown around them to hedge up their
way to death, and have literally forced their passage to the
gates of hell. Sin was their voluntary choice.
6. Why should the doctrine of election be
made a stumbling-block in the way of sinners? In nothing else
do they make the same use of the purposes and designs of God,
as they do on the subject of religion; and yet, in everything
else, God's purposes and designs are as much settled, and have
as absolute an influence. God has as certainly designed the day
and circumstances of your death, as whether your soul shall be
saved. It is not only expressly declared in the Bible, but is
plainly the doctrine of reason. What would you say if you should
be called in to see a neighbor who was sick; and, on inquiry,
you should find he would neither eat nor drink, and that he was
verily starving himself to death. On expostulating with him upon
his conduct, suppose he should calmly reply, that he believed
in the sovereignty of God, in foreknowledge, election and decrees;
that his days were numbered, that the time and circumstances
of his death were settled, that he could not die before his time,
and that all efforts he could make would not enable him to live
a moment beyond his time; and if you attempted to remonstrate
against his inference, and such an abuse and perversion of the
doctrine of decrees, he should accuse you of being a heretic,
of not believing in divine sovereignty. Now, should you see a
man on worldly subjects reasoning and acting thus, you would
pronounce him insane. Should farmers, mechanics, and merchants,
reason in this way in regard to their worldly business, they
would be considered fit subjects for bedlam.
7. How forcibly the perversion and abuse of
this doctrine illustrate the madness of the human heart, and
its utter opposition to the terms of salvation! The fact that
God foreknows, and has designs in regard to every other event,
is not made an excuse for remaining idle, or worse than idle,
on these subjects. But where men's duty to God is concerned,
and here alone, they seize these scriptures, and wrest them to
their own destruction. How impressively does this fact bring
out the demonstration, that sinners want an excuse for disobeying
God; that they desire an apology for living in sin; that they
seek an occasion for making war upon their Maker.
8. I have said, that the question is as much
open for your decision, that you are left as perfectly to the
exercise of your freedom, as if God neither knew or designed
anything in regard to your salvation. Suppose there was a great
famine in New York city, and that John Jacob Astor alone had
provisions in great abundance; that he was a benevolent and liberal-minded
man, and willing to supply the whole city with provisions, free
of expense; and suppose there existed a universal and most unreasonable
prejudice against him, insomuch that when he advertised in the
daily papers that his storehouses were open, that whosoever would,
might come and receive provisions, without money and without
price, they all, with one accord, began to make excuse, and obstinately
refused to accept the offers. Now, suppose that he should employ
all the cartmen to carry provisions around the city, and stop
at every door. But still they strengthened each other's hands,
and would rather die than be indebted to him for food. Many had
said so much against him, that they were utterly ashamed to feel
and acknowledge their dependence upon him. Others were so much
under their influence as to be unwilling to offend them; and
so strong was the tide of public sentiment, that no one had the
moral courage to break loose from the multitude and accept of
life. Now, suppose that Mr. Astor knew beforehand the state of
the public mind, and that all the citizens hated him, and had
rather die than be indebted to him for food. Suppose he also
knew, from the beginning, that there were certain arguments that
he could bring to bear upon certain individuals, that would change
their minds, and that he should proceed to press them with these
considerations, until they had given up their opposition, had
most thankfully accepted his provisions, and were saved from
death. Suppose he used all the arguments and means that he wisely
could to persuade the rest, but that, notwithstanding all his
benevolent efforts, they adhered to the resolution, and preferred
death to submission to his proposals. Suppose, further, he had
perfect knowledge from the beginning, of the issue of this whole
matter, would not the question of life and death be as entirely
open for the decision of every individual as if he knew nothing
about it?
9. Some may ask, Why does God use means with
the non-elect, which He is certain they will not accept? I answer,
because He designs that they shall be without excuse. He will
demonstrate His willingness and their obstinacy before the universe.
He will stop their mouths effectually in judgment by a full offer
of salvation; and although He knows that their rejection of the
offer will only enhance their guilt, and aggravate their deep
damnation, still He will make the offer, as there is no other
way in which to illustrate His infinite willingness to save them,
and their perverse rejection of His grace.
10. Lastly, God requires you to give all diligence
to make your calling and election sure. In choosing His elect,
you must understand that He has thrown the responsibility of
their being saved upon them; that the whole is suspended upon
their consent to the terms; you are all perfectly able to give
your consent and this moment to lay hold on eternal life. Irrespective
of your own choice, no election could save you, and no reprobation
can damn you. The "Spirit and the Bride say Come: let him
that heareth say, Come; let him that is athirst come; and whosoever
will, let him take the water of life freely" (Rev. 22:17).
The responsibility is yours. God does all that He wisely can,
and challenges you to show what more He could do that He has
not done. If you go to hell, you must go stained with your own
blood. God is clear, angels are clear. To your own Master you
stand or fall; mercy waits; the Spirit strives; Jesus stands
at the door and knocks. Do not then pervert this doctrine, and
make it an occasion of stumbling, till you are in the depths
of hell."140
CONCLUSION
Benjamin Warfield, in this article, has labeled
Charles Finney as a proponent of intentionalism, teleological
ethics, vulgar rationalism, Pelagianism, Hedonism, Universalism,
Perfectionism, Grahamism, laborism, propagandism, Anti-Augustinian
Congruism and Molinism. Classification and generalization are
necessary components of organized study and thought. Often negative
connotations are attached to the terms which symbolize these
generalizations. When this happens, the use of these terms encourages
prejudicial thinking by an evocation of emotion. Christian charity
precludes the use of terms that bring unnecessary offense and/or
are intended to appeal to prejudice. Intellectual assent occurs
when sufficient evidence is brought before the mind. Prejudice
short-circuits this process by replacing evidence with emotion,
most commonly fear. Clear thought and judgement require a mind
unfettered by prejudice. Therefore, any appeal to prejudice would
discard reasoning and replace it with emotional response. Theological
and philosophical discussions have no place for such methods.
Did Warfield refute Finney's theology? Did
he summarize Finney's theology in such a manner as to fairly
represent his views? Did Warfield make valid points or raise
new issues? Did he bring substantive argument to bear upon the
issues at hand? Unhappily, the evidence suggests that these questions
cannot be answered in the affirmative. After wading through the
morass of verbosity provided by Warfield the reader cannot possibly
possess himself/herself of Finney's meaning on these issues (nor
can it be fairly found in any extant review). As Finney once
wrote of another review,
"This review is so very miscellaneous
in its character, that to reply to it in extenso, were
but little less than to rewrite the volume reviewed. Everyone
familiar with the work criticized by the reviewer, will perceive
upon an attentive perusal that the reviewer had not made himself
well acquainted with the work in question; and that, almost without
an exception, a complete answer to his objections might be quoted
verbatim from the work itself. I have read and reread his review,
and every time with increasing wonder that the reviewer could
pass over, so apparently without reading or consideration, the
full and complete answer to nearly all his objections which is
found in the book he was reviewing."141
Warfield dogmatized where he should have reasoned.
He appealed to prejudice (bare assertions) and ignorance (misrepresentation)
when he should have met argument with argument. Warfield is not
alone in his misrepresentations as he followed the methods of
his seminary professor and mentor, Charles Hodge. It can be said
with much certainty that he did not understand that which he
opposed. Obviously content with a cursory perusal of the work,
he constantly misrepresented Finney's views, often making false
issues. Both Finney and G.F. Wright make valid and noteworthy
points (in response to Hodge's similar reviews):
"The laws of logic are inherent in every
mind; but in various states of development in different minds.
If a truth which needs demonstration, and which is capable of
demonstration, is barely announced and not demonstrated, the
mind feels a dissatisfaction and does not rest short of the demonstration
of which it feels the necessity. It is therefore of little use
to dogmatize, when we ought to reason, demonstrate, and explain.
In all cases of truths not self-evident, or of truths needing
proof, religious teachers should understand and comply with the
logical conditions of knowledge and rational belief; they tempt
God when they merely dogmatize where they ought to reason, explain,
and prove, throwing the responsibility of producing conviction
and faith upon the sovereignty of God. God convinces and produces
faith, not by an overthrow of, but in accordance with, the fixed
laws of the mind. It is therefore ridiculous to dogmatize and
assert, when explanation, illustration, and proof are possible,
and demanded by the laws of the intellect. To do this, and then
leave it for God to make the people understand and believe, may
be at present convenient for us, but if it be not death to our
auditors, no thanks are due to us."142
"Does he meet argument with argument?
Does he attempt by argument to show that either the premises,
or the conclusions of the book before him are unsound? O, no
indeed. This were a painful and hopeless task. He therefore assumes
the correctness of the peculiarities of what is called old schoolism;
to wit, constitutional sinfulness, physical divine influence,
physical regeneration, natural inability; that the sovereign
will of God is the foundation of moral obligation; that moral
obligation does not imply ability; that moral obligation extends
beyond the sphere of moral agency to the substance of the soul
and body, and that therefore these can be and are sin in every
faculty and part; that the involuntary states of the intellect
and the sensibility are virtuous in a higher degree than benevolence
or goodwill to being is;-I say he assumes the correctness of
these and sundry other similar dogmas; and finding that the conclusions
in the work before him conflict with these, he most conveniently
appeals to the prejudices of all who sympathize with him in those
views, and without one sentence of argument, condemns the work
because of its conclusions."143
"Erudition is worse than useless if it
essentially fails in accuracy. A fig-tree without leaves raises
no false hopes. It is bad enough if the abundant foliage invites
you to a fruitless search. It is superlatively bad if the fruit
that is found be positively poisonous . . .
At this point, we can hardly resist the temptation
to speculate concerning the cause of such misrepresentations
as we have here feebly attempted to review . . . their author
is by nature an advocate, and that he is singularly lacking in
the judicial qualities of mind, which are necessary for understanding
the position of an opponent. Indeed, according to our experience,
he can hardly state the argument of an antagonist without misstating
it . . . Why did he not confine himself to the discussion of
principles in the abstract? Would not the cause of truth have
been better promoted had he written less, and taken more pains
to understand what he opposed, or had he delegated the work of
making summaries to a more judicial mind?"144
Warfield would have saved his reader's fifty
plus pages of reading if he had just written a single syllogism:
Whatever is inconsistent with the system that I hold to is in error;
The system under question is inconsistent with the system that I hold to;
Therefore, the theological system under question is in error.
It would be better to read the first fifty
pages of Finney's Systematic Theology than to read Warfield's
article. At least the reader would have a first-hand understanding
of its unfiltered contents.
The cause of truth still awaits the appearance
of a judicial mind and theological champion to show the Christian
church a "still better way" than that laid out in Finney's
Systematic Theology. Reputable theologians such as Hodge, Duffield,
Warfield and most recently MacArthur would have the Church contented
with a dogmatic approach in discussing these all-important issues
as stated by Finney. The Christian church needs a new generation
and class of theologians who demonstrate and stimulate independent,
Biblically-sound thought, unchained from the false philosophical
assumptions and presuppositions that have stagnated advancement
for centuries. Of course, these men and women do exist but, as
ALL great men and women who have effected change by challenging
the assumed orthodoxy of their day, they bear the scarlet
letter "H" or "C" (heretic or cultist). Finney
wrote, "If I know my heart, I am willing and anxious to
have the errors of the work under consideration detected and
exposed, if errors there be in it."145 After one hundred
and forty-five years from the publishing of this great work (Finney's
Systematic Theology), no one has reviewed the work with a reasoned
and fair approach and found issue. Perhaps we should all be reading
Finney to find out why.
Endnotes
This article originally appeared in the
Theological Journal of the Evangelistic Education Ministries.
It is reprinted with permision. All rights are reserved. |